Can Higher Tax Autonomy Enhance Local Fiscal Discipline? Evidence from Tax Decentralization in Poland
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6375384 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Grażyna Bukowska (0000-0002-6344-6240, Faculty of Economic Sciences; University of Warsaw), Joanna Siwińska-Gorzelak (0000-0002-8717-4542, Faculty of Economic Sciences; University of Warsaw) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 299-324 |
| Publication date | 2019-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Publius The Journal of Federalism (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-5950 • E-ISSN: 1747-7107 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/publius/pjy024 |
| OpenAlex | W2883186098 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 59 |
This article explores the impact of local tax autonomy on local fiscal discipline with data for more than 2, 400 Polish municipalities, over the period 2002–2014. The novelty of this study is that we rely on a measure of “de jure” fiscal decentralization, given by the share of own taxes that the local authorities are entitled to collect, before any local tax policies have been implemented. This allows us to verify the systemic impact of local tax autonomy on fiscal balances, which is not affected by local policy choices that can simultaneously change budgetary outcomes. Our results uniformly show that fiscal autonomy is associated with higher fiscal prudence
Autonomy · Decentralization · Economic policy · Economic system · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Law
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| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2021 (2) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |