Transfer-Based Decentralization and Poverty Alleviation
Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in China
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6375651 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Fubing Su (Vassar College), Ming Li (0000-0001-7109-5084, University of Pennsylvania), Ran Tao (0000-0002-4248-6067, Renmin University of China) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 694-718 |
| Publication date | 2019-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Publius The Journal of Federalism (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-5950 • E-ISSN: 1747-7107 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/publius/pjy044 |
| OpenAlex | W2912566302 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 33 |
China launched a massive poverty alleviation program in the 1990s that focused on nationally designated poverty counties. By injecting earmarked transfers with clear spending mandates, the central government hoped for major investments in productive capacities in the poverty counties so they could develop sustainably. Comparing fiscal data of county governments through a regression discontinuity approach, we show that the opposite was true. Poverty county officials failed to make extra investments in production-oriented areas while diversion of central transfers for administrative consumption was rampant. This article develops a better empirical strategy to challenge some earlier findings. Theoretically, this article offers a different case of elite capture under a non-democratic regime. Our focus on poverty regions also reveals the importance of maintaining bureaucratic support in local politics. It complements the popular notion that Chinese local officials are mostly geared toward growth
Bureaucracy · Central government · China · Consumption (sociology · Decentralization · Development economics · Economic growth · Economics · Elite · Government (linguistics · Local government · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Poverty · Sociology · Sustainability · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration
Endogenous Federal Grants and Crowd-out of State Government Spending
Regional poverty targeting in China
The Dangers of Decentralization
Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods
State corroding federalism
Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu
Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels
Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics
The Logic of Political Survival
Decentralization and corruption
The Political Resource Curse
Bridging the Economic Divide Within Countries
Achieving balance in decentralization
Pro-poor targeting and accountability of local governments in West Bengal
Second generation fiscal federalism
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures
Law and Finance
Monitoring Corruption
Federalism, Chinese Style
Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China
Beyond the Fiction of Federalism
Can Subnational Autonomy Strengthen Democracy in Bolivia
Fiscal Reform and Public Education Spending
The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia
Decentralization and Governance
Decentralization of Governance and Development
Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives
Anomalies
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2022 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |