The Political Economy of Local Governments’ Requests for Permission to Override Central Fiscal Limitations
Insights from Israel
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6376342 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Omer Kimhi (University of Haifa), Itai Beeri (0000-0002-8731-9772, School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa , Israel , [email protected]), Yaniv Reingewertz (0000-0002-6957-8623, School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa , Israel , [email protected]) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 605-631 |
| Publication date | 2022-09-16 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Publius The Journal of Federalism (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-5950 • E-ISSN: 1747-7107 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/publius/pjac021 |
| OpenAlex | W4283783979 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 41 |
Central governments often restrict municipalities’ ability to raise or reduce taxes, but, in many jurisdictions, municipalities can ask the central government’s permission to set aside these limitations. Using an Israeli dataset, we explore this prevalent, yet unexplored, mechanism we call Permission to Override (PtO). We find that in Israel, at least, the central government’s approval and rejection of these permission requests seem to be equitable and non-political. However, despite the central neutrality, municipalities with lower socio-economic status and fewer political connections tend not to submit requests. Municipalities are also reluctant to submit requests before elections and tend to submit them only afterwards. These socio-economic and political biases may create inequalities and hinder a successful use of the PtO mechanism. We discuss the limited use of this mechanism (requests amount to approximately 0.6 percent of the total property tax income) and its shortcomings and draw conclusions from the Israeli case study
Aside · Business · Central government · Economics · Government (linguistics · Local government · Neutrality · Permission · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Set-aside · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Law · Public Administration
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| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,67 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |