Clientelism and Electoral Competition
The Case of Chile’s Municipalities
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6380248 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Felipe Livert (0000-0003-3658-6886), Gabriel Avila (0000-0003-2399-3394, Alberto Hurtado University), Constanza Carrasco (Alberto Hurtado University) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Issue | ahead |
| Publication date | 2023-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Revista de ciencia política (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0716-1417 • E-ISSN: 0718-090X |
| Publisher | SciELO Agencia Nacional de Investigacion y Desarrollo (ANID) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.4067/s0718-090x2023005000120 |
| OpenAlex | W4388565742 |
| SCIELO_PID | S0718-090X2023005000120 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 41 |
Patronage is often considered a subtype of clientelism that arises through reciprocal arrangements between a politician and a citizen, where electoral support is rewarded with public employment. In Chile, there is evidence of clientelist practices at the municipal level. However, these studies have mainly had a qualitative focus. To complement these studies, this research aims to provide quantitative evidence using panel data and two-way fixed effects. Thus, we analyse the personnel hiring through the Mercado Público platform between 2009 and 2017 across the country’s 345 municipalities, finding evidence that support two hypotheses: (i) there is a political budget cycle, increasing spending by 14.9% during the election year and (ii) independent politicians spend less on hiring people than mayors who are militants of political parties, being this expenditure -9.8% less for independents than for the latter. These results seek to complement other research on clientelism and patronage in a context of the rise of independent politicians and citizen questioning of traditional political parties, as well as the relevance of public spending in local governments
Clientelism · Competition (biology · Complement (music · Context (archaeology · Democracy · Economics · Geography · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Law · Political and Social Dynamics in Chile and Latin America · Public Administration
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| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |