Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Voluntary Retirement from Danish Local Government
Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Voluntary Retirement from Danish Local Government
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6382201 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ulf Hjelmar (0000-0002-6028-0230, Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies), Anne Lisbeth Olsen (0000-0002-7365-6161, Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies), Asmus Leth Olsen, Lene Holm Pedersen (0000-0003-0933-7585, Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 402-416 |
| Publication date | 2010-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Scandinavian Political Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0080-6757 • E-ISSN: 1467-9477 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9477.2010.00257.x |
| OpenAlex | W1915729792 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 27 |
Why do politicians choose to retire voluntarily from a position they have been working hard to get? It is argued in this article that the institutional setting of the elected assemblies influences the direct, as well as the alternative costs and benefits of having a political career and hence the patterns of voluntary retirement. Drawing on previous research from the United States Congress, this is explored in a new empirical setting: local government in Denmark. The results show that positions at the labour market matter as private-sector employees are more likely to retire than public-sector employees. Furthermore, internal institutional factors matter. Holding an institutional position such as chairing a committee makes retirement less likely. Furthermore, seniority makes the councillors more likely to retire when age is controlled for – a result not found in national studies. However, councillors who reach a high-ranking position at an early stage are not more likely to quit with seniority than those who do not reach such a position. A high personal share of votes decreases voluntary retirement. In contrast to previous findings, the ideological distance from the ruling party does not play a role. This may be due to norms of consensus in the local councils
Business · Danish · Demographic economics · Economics · Government (linguistics · Ideology · Labour economics · Local government · Management · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Ranking (information retrieval · Seniority · Turnover · Cultural Industries and Urban Development · Finance · Law · Public Administration · Retirement, Disability, and Employment · Social Policy and Reform Studies
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| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,75 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2025 (12) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |