A Tale of Two Councils. Explaining the Weakness of the SVP in the Upper House of the Federal Parliament

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6384259
AutoresRomain Lachat (0000-0002-7168-1291, University of Zurich, autor correspondente)
Ano2006
Volume12
Fascículo4
Páginas77-99
Data de publicação2006-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoSwiss Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1424-7755 • E-ISSN: 1662-6370
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1002/j.1662-6370.2006.tb00061.x
OpenAlexW2038184560
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas9

The SVP is the strongest party in the National Council, but the weakest among governmental parties in the Council of States. This article analyses possible explanations for this surprising difference by combining macro-level information on electoral results and data from recent election studies. The results presented show that the weakness of the SVP in the Council of States is due neither to its decision to compete only in selected constituencies, nor to “mechanical” effects of the electoral system. Rather, this weakness is explained both by the strategic behaviour of voters, who avoid “wasting” their vote in the majoritarian election of the Council of States, and by incumbency effects. The SVP is further disadvantaged by its ideological position, as its candidates have more difficulty gathering the majority of votes required for election in the Council of States than do, for instance, those of the centre-right parties

Disadvantaged · Economics · Ideology · Lower house · Parliament · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Weakness · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Public Administration · Finance