Electoral Rules and Incentives to Protect Human Rights
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6394635 |
|---|---|
| Autores | David Cingranelli (0000-0003-4016-2058), Mikhail Filippov, Михаил Филиппов (0000-0001-8551-6724) |
| Año | 2010 |
| Volumen | 72 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 243-257 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2010-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Journal of Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-3816 • E-ISSN: 1468-2508 |
| Editorial | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0022381609990594 |
| OpenAlex | W2170125557 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 52 |
| Referencias citadas | 32 |
In order to function as an effective constraint on human rights violations, democratic competition must put politicians in a situation where it is electorally beneficial for them to monitor abuses and to expose public officials who fail to protect human rights. In the absence of proper electoral incentives, both incumbent politicians and opposition leaders may strategically choose to ignore poor human rights practices. Building on this logic, we assess the proposition that, among democracies, certain electoral rules are associated with better protection of physical integrity rights. We find that, other things equal, there is higher average respect for physical integrity rights in countries where all members of parliament are elected through low magnitude proportional representation districts, and where voters can cast a vote for individual candidates. Our theoretical approach focusing on incentives for politicians to protect human rights offers a unifying framework for studying institutional and noninstitutional effects on different categories of human rights
Business · Constraint (computer-aided design · Democracy · Economics · Function (biology · Human rights · Incentive · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Opposition (politics · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Proportional representation · Proposition · Public economics · Representation (politics · Corruption and Economic Development · Human Rights and Development · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
Why Do Governments Abuse Human Rights?
Why Delegate?
The Humble Cosmopolitan
Tracking justice democratically
The Cingranelli and Richards (Ciri) Human Rights Data Project
Military Presence and Risk Mitigation
No Taxation Without Representation? An Empirical Examination of the Relationship Between Democratization and Tax Compliance
Revisionist Conflict and State Repression
Foreign Constitutional Guarantee of Voting Right
The Power of the Pen
Torture Approval in Comparative Perspective
Examining extrajudicial killings
Who Tortures the Terrorists? Transnational Terrorism and Military Torture
Bridging the Gap
Does social spending add substance to formal rights
Institutionalized autocracies, policy interdependence, and labor rights
Respect for Physical-Integrity Rights in the Twenty-First Century
Comprehensive Retrospective Voting in Mixed Electoral Systems
Democracy and human rights
Domestic politics and the power to punish
The Impact of Pro-Government Militias on Human Rights Violations
Lobbying, Access Points, and the Protection of Human Rights in Democracies
The psychological effects of state socialization
Measuring presidential centrism and its effect on repression
Why voters (sometimes) punish repression
Of One’s Own Making
Disaggregating Torture Allegations
Conceptualizing and Measuring Institutional Variation in National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs)
Nationalism and torture
Oil discoveries, civil war, and preventive state repression
From Litigation to Rights
Policy Disputes, Political Survival, and the Onset and Severity of State Repression
Loyalty or Accountability? Public Attitudes to Holding Soldiers Accountable for the Murder and Abuse of Civilians
Democracy and the Concept of Personal Integrity Rights
Threat Perception and American Support for Torture
The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Multiparty Systems
Electoral Politics and the Party Politicisation of Human Rights
Does Police Militarization Increase Repression
Governments, Informal Links to Militias, and Accountability
The Political Costs of Abusing Human Rights
Information Politics Versus Organizational Incentives
Popular versus Elite Democracies and Human Rights
What Stops the Torture
When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence
Investor Rights versus Human Rights
Principals, Agents and Human Rights
The persistence of sexual assault within the US military
State Violence, Party Formation, and Electoral Accountability
An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression
Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time
The Contributions of the Ombudsman to Human Rights in Latin America, 1982-2011
Ensuring Liberties
Agents of Atrocity
Designing Federalism
The Economic Effects of Constitutions
Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption
Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 1987
Clarify
The Logic of Political Survival
Development as Freedom
State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace
Could changing the electoral rules fix European parliament elections
Famine Mortality, Rational Political Inactivity, and International Food Aid
Democracy, threats and political repression in developing countries
Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited
Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations
Seeing Double
"Constitutional Promises" and Repressive Reality
From Statism To Federalism
Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1977-1996)
Political Repression and Public Perceptions of Human Rights
Thinking Inside the Box
Money with a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries
Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights
What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research
Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights
Trade and the variety of democratic institutions
Incentives to cultivate a personal vote
Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s
From ballots to bullets
Security Forces and Sexual Violence
Good Things to Those Who Wait? National Elections and Government Respect for Human Rights
| Obras citantes distintas | 52 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 3,25 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 52 |