Engineering Informal Institutions
Long-Run Impacts of Alternative Dispute Resolution on Violence and Property Rights in Liberia
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6395481 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alexandra C Hartman (0000-0001-6847-3734, University College London), Robert A Blair (0000-0001-6054-1421, John Brown University), Christopher Blattman (0000-0001-7748-4507, University of Chicago) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 83 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 381-389 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3816 • E-ISSN: 1468-2508 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/709431 |
| OpenAlex | W3088354872 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 13 |
| References cited | 12 |
Informal institutions govern property rights and disputes when formal systems are weak. Effective informal institutions should help people reach and maintain bargains, minimizing violence. Can outside organizations engineer persistent institutional change? Will this strengthen property rights and investment? We experimentally evaluate a United Nations and civil society mass education campaign to promote alternative dispute resolution practices and norms in rural Liberia, where violent land disputes are common. Prior work showed a drop in violence and unresolved disputes within one year. We return after three years to test for sustained impacts and mechanisms. Treated communities report large, persistent drops in violent disputes and a slight shift toward nonviolent norms. Treated residents also report larger farms, although overall effects on property rights and investment are mixed. Politically connected residents report more secure property rights, while those with fewer connections feel less secure. Sustained institutional engineering is feasible, but politics shapes distributional outcomes
Business · Civil society · Dispute resolution · Economic growth · Economics · Investment (military · Political science · Politics · Property rights · Work (physics · Agricultural risk and resilience · Engineering · Land Rights and Reforms · Law · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion
Selective Civilian Targeting
Leveraging Social Cohesion for Development Outcomes
Why Do People Use Informal Justice? Experimental Evidence from Kosovo
Can Appeals for Peace Promote Tolerance and Mitigate Support for Extremism? Evidence from an Experiment with Adolescents in Burkina Faso
Promoting access to justice in Bangladesh
Delegative peacebuilding
Resolving land conflicts through Alternative Dispute Resolution
State-Building in the City
War-related victimization and social distance toward others
Hierarchies of Violence, Victimhood, and Remedy in the Pursuit of Women’s Rights After War
Institutionalized governance on organizations via norm‐based policy instrument
Land and Politics
Preventing Rebel Resurgence after Civil War
Order without Law
Property and Political Order in Africa
Institutions and Social Conflict
Thinking, Fast and Slow? Some Field Experiments to Reduce Crime and Dropout in Chicago
Reducing Crime and Violence
Handbook Of Development Economics
The Profits of Power
Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement
Law and Social Change
Predicting local violence
How to Promote Order and Property Rights under Weak Rule of Law? An Experiment in Changing Dispute Resolution Behavior through Community Education
| Unique citing works | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,25 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 13 |