The Strategic Use of Congressional Intergovernmental Delegation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6396408 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Pamela J Clouser Mccann (0000-0002-2314-9655, Southern California University for Professional Studies, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 620-634 |
| Publication date | 2015-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3816 • E-ISSN: 1468-2508 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/681057 |
| OpenAlex | W2268275250 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 24 |
Congressional delegation choices are widely studied, but scholars have overlooked the states as an inherent part of this process. How do members of Congress with state constituents delegate responsibility to the states? This article incorporates states and legislators with state-based interests in a theory of intergovernmental delegation and argues that members of Congress consider their relationship with their state government vis-à-vis their connection with the national executive branch as they make intergovernmental delegation choices. This theory is tested against current explanations of decentralization: Republican devolution, average partisan congruence between Congress and the states, and policy type using a novel data set spanning over 30 years, 30,000 provisions, and 197 significant laws. Not only is support for the theory of intergovernmental delegation found, but alternative explanations fail to explain the degree of responsibility delegated to the states in national law, demonstrating the importance of national and state political contexts on delegation
Decentralization · Delegate · Delegation · Devolution (biology · Economics · Executive branch · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Sociology · State (computer science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration
When Federalism Works
Political Game Theory
Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies
Delegating Powers
Specification and testing of some modified count data models
Alternative Estimating and Testing Empirical Strategies for Fractional Regression Models
Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism
Shifting the Color Line
National Election Cycles and the Intermittent Political Safeguards of Federalism
Measuring Gubernatorial Budgetary Power
A New Measure of State Government Ideology, and Evidence that Both the New Measure and an Old Measure Are Valid
Intergovernmental Grants
The Lengthened Shadow of Another Institution? Ideal Point Estimates for the Executive Branch and Congress
Intergovernmental Political Competition in American Federalism
Checks, Balances, and Thresholds
The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,63 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2025 (8) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |