My Post-Postmodern Objective Account of Theory and Moral Analysis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6397668 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Morton A Kaplan (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 675-706 |
| Publication date | 2000-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Review of Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-6705 • E-ISSN: 1748-6858 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034670500042698 |
| OpenAlex | W2128653301 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 6 |
I outline from a non-foundational standpoint why knowledge does not rest on a circular argument and why the nonunivocality of language is compatible with scientific truth and objectivity. The theory sketch is advanced as the form of scientific theory appropriate to homeostatic systems. A rebuttal to the arguments against my theory sketches of international systems permits a concrete and systematic investigation of why the theory sketch—rather than formal theories of the type of physics or historical generalizations - is the appropriate method. I later explore more briefly how theory sketches apply to other types of homeostatic systems. I discuss how the homeostatic control metaphor informs the vicarious test-in-principle that I employ in the area of moral analysis and why other types of moral analysis, including those of Rawls and Nozick, fail. How my position on moral analysis accords with and differs from that of Aristotle is noted
Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Metaphor · Objectivity (philosophy · Postmodernism · Rebuttal · Sketch · Sociology · Computer Science · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,19 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2012 (3) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |