Liberalism and Paternalism
A Critique of Ronald Dworkin
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6400166 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher Wolfe (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 615-640 |
| Publication date | 1994-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Review of Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-6705 • E-ISSN: 1748-6858 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034670500019100 |
| OpenAlex | W2010504294 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
Leading liberal theorist Ronald Dworkin builds a case against paternalism, rooted in his liberal ethical theory, especially the requirement of ethical integrity. But his case is successful only against less sophisticated forms of paternalism. His argument focuses too much on profound ethical convictions, failing to recognize the frequency with which people hold relatively unreflective convictions and the inevitable role of the law in helping to shape convictions. He makes concessions regarding paternalistic actions that come to be endorsed by the persons who are subject to them, but then tries to impose arbitrary limits on such endorsement. Finally, he rests his case against paternalism on the denial of transcendent standards, but is unable to avoid employing such standards himself. Building a case for certain forms of paternalism in a pluralistic liberal democracy is a difficult but necessary task, that can only proceed after removing fallacious objections like Dworkin's
Argument (complex analysis · Classical liberalism · Democracy · Denial · Epistemology · Law and economics · Liberal democracy · Liberalism · Paternalism · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Subject (documents · Law · Medicine · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 1996 - 2018 (23) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |