Putnam, Pragmatism, and Democratic Theory
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6401264 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew Festenstein (0000-0003-2139-6174, University of York, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1995 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 693-722 |
| Publication date | 1995-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Review of Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-6705 • E-ISSN: 1748-6858 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034670500018684 |
| OpenAlex | W2037473456 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 10 |
In a powerful series of texts, Hilary Putnam has criticized what he takes to be a prevalent scientistic conception of objectivity in modern philosophy. This article is concerned with two connected facets of this critique, upon which Putnam himself has laid increasing emphasis: the attempt to reconstruct conceptions of ethical and political value in the wake of his criticism of “metaphysical realist” notions of objectivity, and his affiliation with the tradition of pragmatist philosophy. Four principal manifestations of Putnam's concern with ethical and political value are examined: the internalist argument for moral objectivity; the criticism of instrumental reason; the account of a “moral image”; and the “reconsideration of Deweyan democracy.” It is argued that an interpretation of Dewey's moral and political philosophy provides an illuminating vantage point from to understand the shortcomings of Putnam's ethical and political writings
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Criticism · Democracy · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Objectivity (philosophy · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Pragmatism · Scientism · Value (mathematics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy, Science, and History · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 2002 - 2016 (15) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |