How Policy Entrepreneurs Encourage or Hinder Urban Growth Within a Political Market

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6404590
AutoresEdgar E Ramírez (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas), Manlio F Castillo (0000-0003-0427-6170, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas), Eliana I Sánchez (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas)
Ano2023
Volume59
Fascículo4
Páginas1250-1278
Data de publicação2023-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoUrban Affairs Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1078-0874 • E-ISSN: 1552-8332
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/10780874221097078
OpenAlexW4280612712
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas6
Referências citadas54

This paper updates and extends the Political Market Framework (PMF) by integrating elements of interest groups and political market theory with policy entrepreneurs’ (PEs) roles in explaining the patterns of urban infrastructure construction. The prominent role of PEs is observed through a grounded analysis of two large infrastructure projects in Mexico City. A comparative study of the cases suggests that: (1) The agency of PEs in political markets is central to explaining the construction of urban infrastructure; (2) PEs contribute to the definition of pro-growth or anti-growth coalitions and the definition of public problems; (3) the legitimacy of PEs is grounded in their political or technical reputation, or both; (4) the appropriate use of political institutions requires that PEs know how to use electoral timing strategically; and (5) the role of PEs seems to be better understood within a bounded analysis framework, such as the political markets approach

Agency (philosophy · Economics · Grounded theory · Legitimacy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Qualitative research · Reputation · Social science · Sociology · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Policy Transfer and Learning · Public Policy and Administration Research