Party Preferences and Electoral Reform
How Time in Government Affects the Likelihood of Supporting Electoral Change
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6406532 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jean-Benoit Pilet (0000-0001-5612-0835, Université Libre de Bruxelles), Damien Bol (0000-0002-1896-1294, Ministry of Economy) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 568-586 |
| Publication date | 2011-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | West European Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0140-2382 • E-ISSN: 1743-9655 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01402382.2011.555984 |
| OpenAlex | W2051353508 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 30 |
| References cited | 39 |
Most of the literature asserts that political parties rationally define their preference for electoral reform with respect to their possible gains and the balance of power between and within parties. Other scholars moderate this rationality, underlining the role of the uncertainty inherent to any change in the electoral system. This article shows how risk and expected gains interact. Through an analysis of the preferences of 84 parties in 13 different electoral reform debates, it shows that risk impedes parties from supporting even advantageous change. However, it also points out that not all parties are equally sensitive to risk. Parties that are dissatisfied with the current system are more willing to favour a reform from which they expect gains. In other words, dissatisfaction makes parties more seat-maximising
Balance (ability · Democracy · Economics · Electoral system · Government (linguistics · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Preference · Public economics · Rationality · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Psychology · Social Policy and Reform Studies
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Introduction
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| Unique citing works | 30 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2026 (16) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 30 |