Integrating macro-prudential policy
Central banks as the ‘third force’ in EU financial reform
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6407595 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Samuel Mcphilemy (0000-0002-3749-5903, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 526-544 |
| Publication date | 2016-05-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | West European Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0140-2382 • E-ISSN: 1743-9655 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01402382.2016.1143243 |
| OpenAlex | W2295593944 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 18 |
| References cited | 29 |
In recent years, policy-makers and financial authorities have established an intricate, multi-level framework for 'macro-prudential' policy-making in the European Union. This article argues that central banks have acted as a 'third force' in this process, determining the balance between national and supranational authority and ensuring their own predominance in the macro-prudential policy field. The article demonstrates central banks' policy entrepreneurship through three phases in the creation of the macro-prudential framework: the negotiations surrounding the establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board in 2008–2010; the elaboration of a legal and organisational framework for the use of macro-prudential instruments in the banking sector in 2011–2012; and the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism in 2012–2014. Central banks' influence derived from their perceived expertise in relation to financial stability, their existing delegated authority, and specific advantages stemming from the networked structure of their interactions with each other and supranational policy-makers
Banking Union · Business · Central bank · Economic policy · Economics · Entrepreneurship · European union · Financial crisis · Financial regulation · Financial system · Macro · Macroeconomics · Monetary policy · Negotiation · Political science · Systemic risk · Accounting · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Finance · Global Financial Regulation and Crises · Law · State Capitalism and Financial Governance
Too political to delegate? Financial stability and the politics of depoliticization
Trying not to be caught in the act
Une stabilité financière pour quelle Europe
Theoretical perspectives on the new era of central banking
The domestic sources of macroprudential policy divergence
Central Bank Reform and the Politics of Blame Avoidance in the UK
Frankfurt’s double standard
How did the euro area survive the crisis
The political dynamics behind Europe’s new banking union
The Conundrum of Solving ‘Too Big to Fail’ in the European Union
Managing Climate Change Like a Central Banker
From global diffusion to local semantics
Taming the real estate boom in the EU
Between technocracy and politics
An unexpected climate activist
The Rise and Stall of EU Macro‐Prudential Policy. An Empirical Analysis of Policy Conflicts over Financial Stability, Market Integration, and National Discretion
Introducing ‘ministerial politics
Independence without purpose? Macroprudential regulation at the Bundesbank
Agendas, alternatives, and public policies
The Logic of Collective Action
From the Maastricht Treaty to Post-crisis EMU
The New Political Economy of the Macroprudential Ideational Shift
Power Politics and the Undersupply of Financial Stability in Europe
The Little Engine that Wouldn’t
Reshaping european regulatory space
The political dynamics behind Europe’s new banking union
The creation of European regulatory agencies and its limits
Building Transnational Civil Liberties
Explaining the Reform of Banking Supervision in Europe
Escaping the International Governance Dilemma? Incorporated Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union
Banking Union as Holy Grail
Rational Fictions
The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems
European integration and supranational governance
The role of the Delors Committee in the creation of EMU
The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda
Introduction
Conclusion
| Unique citing works | 18 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,8 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 18 |