Voter incompetence and the legitimacy of representative democracy

Bibliographic Data

ID6420973
AuthorsAndreas Christiansen (0000-0001-7187-4520, University of Copenhagen, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume28
Issue6
Pages927-956
Publication date2023-05-25
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueCritical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1369-8230 • E-ISSN: 1743-8772
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13698230.2023.2214468
OpenAlexW4378214085
LanguageEN
References cited40

Ever since its inception, democracy has been subjected to the objection that ordinary citizens are not fit to rule. I discuss and criticize the most influential contemporary version of this argument, due to Jason Brennan, according to which democracy is illegitimate because voters are incompetent. I accept two core premises of Brennan’s argument – that legitimacy requires competence, and that voters are incompetent (in the sense of competence Brennan accepts) – but reject the conclusion that representative democracy is illegitimate. I show that the argument can be interpreted as making two different claims: (1) That the democratic policymaking process as a whole is incompetent, and democratic policies therefore illegitimate; (2) that only democratic elections are incompetent, which either (a) makes democratic policies illegitimate or (b) makes elections themselves illegitimate. Each of these claims is false: (1) is false because voter incompetence does not taint the policymaking process sufficiently; (2a) is false because incompetent elections do not imply that policies made post-election are illegitimate; and (2b) is false because electoral decisions are not the kinds of things that can be illegitimate in the appropriate way. Finally, I address three potential criticisms of my defense of democracy: (i) that I set the bar for voters’ performance too low, (ii) that the representative democracy I defend is not really democratic, and (iii) that Brennan’s argument is an argument for replacing democracy with epistocracy, rather than for the illegitimacy of representative democracy

Argument (complex analysis · Democracy · Law and economics · Legitimacy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Populism, Right-Wing Movements

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