The Enemy Did Not Pass Beyond This Line

The article is devoted to the analysis of the failure of the German command's strategy in the summer — autumn campaign of 1942. The German command wisely chose its target for this campaign, taking into account the lack of forces after the defeats in the winter of 1941: the oil fields of the Caucasus and the key transport hub Astrakhan, showing a good understanding of the importance of military economics and logistics. However, during the implementation of the plan, the Wehrmacht command began to change the direction of attacks, disperse forces between several targets, and be distracted by secondary targets. In early August, the troops of Army Group A could have easily broken through to one of the main objectives of the campaign, Astrakhan, but did not do so, since this was the area of responsibility of Army Group B. In the end, the German military leaders concentrated their efforts on the capture of Stalingrad, which was not initially included in the list of priority targets. When the Soviet troops closed the trap during Operation Uranus, 33 divisions of the Wehrmacht and the Allies were defeated or surrounded, not counting individual units and subunits. At that time, the offensive into the Caucasus was carried out by 28 divisions, including security and reserve formations, and the German command allocated only one division to storm Astrakhan. The strategic mistakes of the Wehrmacht command became one of the factors that led to the failure of the summer-autumn 1942 campaign

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