Framing Biases in Plea Bargaining Decisions in Those With and Without Criminal Involvement
Tests of Theoretical Assumptions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6433942 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Valerie F Reyna (0000-0003-2851-5797, Human Neuroscience Institute and Center for Behavioral Economics and Decision Research Cornell University Ithaca New York USA, corresponding author), Krystia Reed (0000-0003-4373-3450, Department of Psychology University of Texas El Paso Texas USA), Alisha Sadie Meschkow (Cornell University), Alisha Meschkow (Department of Human Development Cornell University Ithaca New York USA), Vincent Calderon (Department of Human Development Cornell University Ithaca New York USA), Rebecca K Helm (0000-0003-1429-3847, Law School University of Exeter Exeter UK) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Publication date | 2025-02-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Behavioral Decision Making (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0894-3257 • E-ISSN: 1099-0771 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/bdm.70008 |
| OpenAlex | W4407072476 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 67 |
About 95% of criminal convictions in the United States are obtained through plea decisions, a growing global practice. Courts justify these convictions based on defendant choice—defendants, as rational agents, can freely choose to plead guilty or go to trial. However, a fundamental axiom of rational choice—descriptive invariance—has never been effectively tested for plea decisions. To test this axiom, we manipulated gain–loss framing of plea options. The shadow‐of‐trial model, the leading theory of plea decision‐making, is predicated on expected utility theory which is in turn predicated on the invariance axiom; if the axiom is falsified, the entire structure collapses. Thus, framing effects are important as a test of fundamental assumptions undergirding practice and as an empirical phenomenon revealing effects of context. We tested framing effects in students and community members including those with criminal involvement for whom plea bargaining has personal relevance. Varying subtle changes in wording of outcomes, we produced pronounced differences in choices to accept a plea rather than proceed to trial. These framing effects were robust to age, sex, educational attainment, risk propensity (DOSPERT and sensation seeking), and loss aversion. Perceived fairness of the legal system increased acceptance and risk propensity decreased it (each about 32%). However, controlling for those effects, loss (compared to gain) framing increased the odds of going to trial by 664%. Criminal involvement did not account for additional variance. These results are consistent with prospect theory and fuzzy‐trace theory, but they challenge the legal theory of bargaining in “the shadow of trial
Economics · Framing (construction · Framing effect · Persuasion · Plea · Political science · Criminal Justice and Corrections Analysis · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 5 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |