Foucault’s naturalism

The importance of scientific epistemology for the genealogical method

Bibliographic Data

ID6444992
AuthorsLeonard D’cruz (0000-0002-1508-1566, The University of Melbourne, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume51
Issue10
Pages1656-1682
Publication date2024-03-16
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy & Social Criticism (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0191-4537 • E-ISSN: 1461-734X
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/01914537241235571
OpenAlexW4392885494
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited25

This article offers a novel reconstruction of Foucault’s methodology that emphasises his respect for the natural sciences. Foucault’s work has long been suspected of reducing knowledge to power, and thus collapsing into unconstrained relativism and methodological incoherence. These concerns are predicated on a misunderstanding of Foucault’s overall approach, which takes the form of a historico-critical project rather than a normative epistemology. However, Foucault does sometimes make normative epistemological judgements, especially about the human sciences. Furthermore, there are outstanding questions about what secures the descriptive rigour of the genealogical method. To address these issues, I develop two claims that will significantly enrich our understanding of Foucault’s methodology. The first is that Foucault’s respect for the natural sciences is crucial in making sense of his normative epistemological judgements. The second is that the descriptive rigour of his genealogical method derives from the fact it is modelled on empirical inquiry

Epistemology · Naturalism · Social epistemology · Sociology · Foucault, Power, and Ethics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Social Theory · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism

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