The expressive injustice of being rich

Bibliographic Data

ID6445490
AuthorsDavid V Axelsen (0000-0003-0711-7087, University of Essex), Lasse Nielsen (0000-0003-3093-4448, University of Southern Denmark, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume24
Issue4
Pages291-312
Publication date2024-11-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitics Philosophy & Economics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1470-594X • E-ISSN: 1741-3060
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/1470594x241292371
OpenAlexW4404018596
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited49

According to limitarianism , it is morally impermissible to be too rich . We consider three main challenges to limitarianism: the redundancy objection , the inconclusiveness objection , and the commitment objection . As a distributive principle, we find that limitarianism fails to overcome the three objections—even taking recent theoretical innovations into account. Instead, we suggest that the core commitment of limitarianism can be drawn from the excess intuition . It entails that at some point, people's claims to retain wealth become qualitatively different: they become preposterous from the point of view of interpersonal morality and justification. Extreme wealth, we argue, adds a distinctive expressive reason to worry about inequality and insufficiency, compounding these other distributive injustices. In retaining or wasting excess wealth while others have too little, the wealthy send a message of complete disregard for the interests of their co-citizens. They express that their disadvantaged compatriots have a diminished moral standing

Criminology · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Injustice · Law and economics · Political science · Sociology · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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