The distinctiveness of relational equality

Bibliographic Data

ID6445494
AuthorsDevon Ca (0000-0002-0607-2086, Nova University of Lisbon, Portugal, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume24
Issue1
Pages51-71
Publication date2024-05-20
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitics Philosophy & Economics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1470-594X • E-ISSN: 1741-3060
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/1470594x241251389
OpenAlexW4398140218
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited60

In recent years, a distinction between two concepts of equality has been much discussed: “distributive” equality involves people having equal amounts of a good such as welfare or resources, and “social” or “relational” equality involves the absence of (certain kinds of) social hierarchy and the presence of (certain kinds of) equal social relations. This contrast is commonly thought to have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between equality and justice. But the nature and significance of the distinction is far from clear. I examine several accounts of this issue and argue none are entirely satisfactory. In turn, I offer an alternative proposal. Relational equality, on my account, involves a concern with each person having an equal “civic status.” I characterize this concern and show it has distinctive and normatively significant positional and temporal aspects

Optimal distinctiveness theory · Computer Science · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology