Limited Foresight and Gridlock in Bargaining

Bibliographic Data

ID6447005
AuthorsParth Parihar (corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume20
Issue1
Pages71-100
Publication date2025-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueQuarterly Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1554-0626 • E-ISSN: 1554-0634
PublisherNow Publishers (PUBLISHER • NL)
DOI10.1561/100.00022032
OpenAlexW4406334760
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited23

This paper contributes to the study of gridlock by analyzing a model of repeated two-party bargaining in which status quo agreements and proposal power are in general both endogenous. I introduce a key object, the foresight horizon, to index the number of downstream agreements agents incorporate into their decision-making on current policy. Gridlock occurs in equilibrium if and only if foresight is limited. I relate equilibrium behavior within the specific setting of legislative bargaining to observed phenomena in public policy-making. While there is short-run correlation of future policy with the status quo, policy converges in the long-run of equilibrium play to an invariant distribution, independent of where it begins. I also demonstrate that policy polarization — the gap between parties’ actionable proposals — is increasing in their foresight

Economics · Futures studies · Gridlock · Political science · Politics · Computer Science · Labor Movements and Unions · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Merger and Competition Analysis

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