Green macrofinancial bargains

How Economic Interests Enable and Limit Climate Action

Bibliographic Data

ID6449169
AuthorsNils Kupzok (0000-0003-3024-6864, Columbia University), Jonas Nahm (0000-0003-1742-5999, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies)
Year2025
Volume32
Issue3
Pages569-592
Publication date2025-01-28
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueReview of International Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0969-2290 • E-ISSN: 1466-4526
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09692290.2025.2453502
OpenAlexW4406914685
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited46

In the late 2010s, countries began to strengthen policies that redirect financial flows into decarbonisation, such as higher carbon prices and new green industrial policies. However, investments remain below what is necessary to reach official climate targets. We argue that the green turn reflects the success and limits of political bargains that attempt to use decarbonisation as a means to fortify countries’ growth models and dominant economic interests. Such bargains have proven effective in overcoming entrenched path dependencies, unlocking policy progress. But these bargains also entail trade-offs that constrain the scope and goals of decarbonisation. Prioritizing incumbent economic interests can slow emission cuts, limit tools to the unpopular and ineffective, and thwart visions of a just transition. To develop this argument empirically, we provide original quantitative estimates of climate policies in the G20 and conduct case studies of the UK, the EU, and South Korea

Action (physics · Economic system · Economics · Limit (mathematics · Physics · Political science · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies · Energy, Environment, Economic Growth

Tools

Open DOI