Better Not to Know
On the Possibility of Culpable Knowledge
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6451977 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jimmy Alfonso Licon (0000-0001-9451-291X, Arizona State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 106-114 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Epistemology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0269-1728 • E-ISSN: 1464-5297 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/02691728.2024.2326822 |
| OpenAlex | W4393054461 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 21 |
Many philosophers hold there are genuine cases of culpable ignorance. This paper argues that there are conditions that can render knowledge epistemically culpable too. First, we contrast culpable ignorance with morally culpable knowledge. Second, we examine the nature of epistemically culpable knowledge using a key example. We then highlight empirical support for the claim that there are real-world conditions that make epistemically culpable knowledge possible. Next, we survey three kinds of epistemic culpability fostered by culpable knowledge. Finally, we address the benefits objection and argue that it fails
Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Controlling Attitudes
Mate selection—A selection for a handicap
Epistemological Duties
Responsibility for Implicit Bias
Some moral benefits of ignorance
The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions
Moral Reputation
The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification
Omniscience and ignorance
Culpable Ignorance
Job Market Signaling
The halo effect
The relationship between belief and credence
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |