Scientism and the Problem of Self-Referential Incoherence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6451978 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Zoltán Vecsey (0000-0001-7502-7548, MTA-SZTE-DE Research Group for Theoretical Linguistics and Informatics (Hungarian Academy of Sciences), corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 262-275 |
| Publication date | 2023-12-21 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Epistemology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0269-1728 • E-ISSN: 1464-5297 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/02691728.2023.2294852 |
| OpenAlex | W4390061602 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 17 |
In recent discussions on the possibilities and boundaries of science, the term ‘scientism’ has been used with multiple meanings. In this paper, this term is taken to refer to a strong epistemic thesis according to which scientific research is the only reliable source of knowledge. Strong epistemic scientism has been recently criticized from different points of view. A recurrent accusation is that the thesis is self-referentially incoherent. After giving an overview of the critical arguments and the answers given to them, I will try to point out that the debate concerning the correctness of scientism is based on a questionable background assumption about the role of higher-order justification
Correctness · Economics · Epistemology · False accusation · Order (exchange · Scientism · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |