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Reflections on Loughborough relativism

Bibliographic Data

ID7102171
AuthorsG Mclennan (0000-0002-0248-4497, University of Bristol, corresponding author)
Year2001
Volume14
Issue3
Pages85-101
Publication date2001-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueHistory of the Human Sciences (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0952-6951 • E-ISSN: 1461-720X
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/09526950122121014
OpenAlexW2017194507
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited17

Through two exchanges in this journal, a type of relativism has been advanced by a group of authors from Loughborough University with a view to demolishing what they see as ‘bottom line’ arguments for critical realism in the social sciences. Jauntily dismissing realism, they also soberly disown the supposed ‘extreme’ consequences that some realists insist follow naturally from relativist conceptions of social inquiry. In this article, I contest the Loughborough team’s arguments. Their presentation of relativism itself can be reconstructed in at least three different ways, none of which suffices to undermine a generally realist account of explanatory endeavour. The most productive note in the critics’ conceptual register highlights the utility of rhetorical analysis; yet this can proceed effectively only if it is neutral with respect to different epistemic and ontological stances. The most productive thematic possibility raised in their articles, and shared with several other recent discussions, signals that realism and relativism may not be anything like fixed and opposed stances; yet the polemical thrust of their anti-realism compromises this insight

CONTEST · Critical realism (philosophy of perception · Epistemology · Realism · Relativism · Rhetorical question · Sociology · Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice · Critical Realism in Sociology · Foucault, Power, and Ethics · Philosophy

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