Theoretical Concepts and Observables

Bibliographic Data

ID7103035
AuthorsD Willer (0000-0002-2763-3962, corresponding author), Murray Webster
Year1970
Volume35
Issue4
Pages748-748
Publication date1970-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Sociological Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0003-1224 • E-ISSN: 1939-8271
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.2307/2093949
OpenAlexW2314349903
LanguageEN
Citations received32
References cited4

properties of particular persons, places, or events.' Constructs used in a theory must be defined for that purpose, whereas observables usually need not be. The construct is not same as observable features of any particular event or object, nor is it simply an abstract representation of an observable. In previous example, sociologist might make assertions about differences in construct and then say that occupation and sex are characteristics. It would not be accurate to argue that characteristics are the same thing as occupation and race, for there are many other possible characteristics; similarly, it would not be accurate to say that differences are only important differences between men and women, or between clerks and laborers. All that would be claimed is that, for present purpose of making specific theoretical statements, sex and occupation will be taken as indicators of differences; theoretical statements to be made will be statements about construct status characteristic, not about sex and occupation. it should be case that in some other time or culture sex and occupation are not characteristics (as theoretically defined), then one could not use theoretical statements about characteristics to derive statements about sex and occupation. However, and very importantly, statements about characteristics could be made and could have meaning independently of any such particular historical circumstance; that is, they would enable predictions for whatever observable characteristics happen to meet definition of characteristics in different culture. The differences in orientation to theory construction which accompany use of these two types of concepts are enormous, and, we believe, are of fundamental importance to sociology. There is a crucial difference between being concerned with explaining relations between observables and being concerned with explaining relations between theoretical constructs. Part of reason difference is of such importance may be seen by examining type of theoretical statements which would be offered as an adequate explanation for a finding. To a person who makes statements about observable concepts, explanation of those statements usually is in terms of derivation from other statements about observables; to a person who makes statements about theoretical constructs, explanation will be by derivation from other statements about theoretical constructs. The type of explana1Strictly speaking, any word used to represent an event or an object is an abstraction from reality and, hence, is not completely accessible to senses. Thus it might appear that distinction drawn here between observables and is one of degree, rather than being absolute. However, in addition to being abstract, it is also required that be explicitly or implicitly defined in propositions of a theory; such definition is seldom necessary for observables. In addition, there are usually vast differences of degree of abstraction between concepts utilized in everyday speech and those used as theoretical constructs. Both for clarity of exposition, and because of fundamental differences of orientation between types of interests served by use of these two types of concepts, distinction will be treated here as an absolute one. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.221 on Sun, 06 Nov 2016 05:32:14 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 750 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW tion constructed will reflect interest of sociologist: whether he is primarily interested in observables for their own sake or is primarily interested in development of in scientific theory. These different types of concepts and interests have sometimes been described as being related to different levels of generality. 2 However, there is no demonstrated justification for implicit assumption that and observables exist on any sort of continuum. Constructs and observables must be connected in testing and application of a theory (or in its development), but they are different in type-constructs are result of thought; observables, of sensation. The distinction made above may be examined from these two points of view, using finding by Strodtbeck et al., (1958:387) as basis for an illustration of difference between (observable) and (construct) points of view: Men, in contrast with women, and persons of higher-status, in contrast with lower-status, occupations have higher participation, influence, satisfaction, and perceived competence for jury task. A sociologist with primarily an orientation would be mainly interested in observable concepts men and women, and in observable concepts laborer, clerk, and proprietor which are summarized by Strodtbeck et al., with general terms higher occupations and lower occupations.3 An explanation for finding would then be made in terms of observables. For example, original authors offer as part of their explanation statement: We assume that business discipline and related experiences of higher-status occupations involve both substantive knowledge and interactional skills that may be used during deliberation (Strodtbeck et al., 1958:387). Of particular significance is lack of abstraction of concepts used, both in original statement and in statement offered to explain it; these concepts are very close to being immediately accessible to direct sensory experience. An explanation consists in establishing a related set of antecedent conditions, statements about other previously occurring observables, which are then offered to explain finding. By contrast, a sociologist with primarily a 4 focus of interest would be inclined to relate original statement to a set of connected theoretical constructs. If, for example, he considered sex and occupation to be characteristics, and had statements relating characteristics to other theoretical constructs, which in turn were related to observable interaction, then these more abstract statements would be offered as an explanation for finding. In this type of explanation, set of antecedent conditions clearly would be of secondary interest; conditions would be noted only as necessary given conditions for application of explanatory principles. Thus an explanation differs from a explanation in relative importance given to statements of observable antecedent conditions and to law-like assertions relating concepts. In explanation, primary attention is given to establishing a complete set of necessary antecedent conditions which are intended as a causal explanation of findings. A explanation is far less concerned with establishing a set of particular observables as antecedent conditions, and is primarily concerned with precise and consistent formulation of laws. 5 For example, parts of theory by Berger et al. (1966:39, 40) might be used to construct an explanation for Strodtbeck, et al. finding: If p [person] and o [other] possess differentially evaluated states of D [a diffuse characteristic], and D is relevant to C [a specific task ability] . . .. p will assign states of C . . . that are bal2 See, for example, Stinchcombe, 1968, especially pp. 47-56. 3 These terms cannot be called constructs because they are not used in any explicit theory; no explicit definition exists either. Therefore, their usage and meaning are unconstrained, and they are unlikely to convey any unique or uniform meaning. 4Use of terms empirical and conceptual is intended solely as a convenient notation. They are not intended to imply that those persons subscribing to former do not conceptualize, or that those subscribing to latter do not perform tests. 5 For a similar view, see Hempel (1965:231

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