Is Legal Knowledge Practical
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7149146 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Giovanni Tuzet (0000-0003-4214-4275, Bocconi University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 256-275 |
| Publication date | 2025-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0841-8209 • E-ISSN: 2056-4260 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/cjlj.2025.2 |
| OpenAlex | W4409824510 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 2 |
Given the distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how, one could claim that legal knowledge is eminently practical: One who knows the law enjoys some form of knowing-how, namely, how to exercise certain intellectual faculties, or how to perform such activities as interpreting legal texts or arguing a case. I present some arguments to the effect that legal knowledge is not practical, being rather propositional in nature, as knowing-that instead of knowing-how. This is not to deny, however, that such activities as interpretation and argumentation are extremely important in the legal domain. I also consider whether legal knowledge is practical in a different sense—namely, with a view to decision and action. I contend that it is not practical in this sense either, even if it is mainly used for practical purposes
Argumentation theory · Descriptive knowledge · Epistemology · Linguistics · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law in Society and Culture · Legal Education and Practice Innovations · Philosophy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |