Differentiation and Generic Sentences

Bibliographic Data

ID7150249
AuthorsPatrick Rothermund (0009-0003-9766-5235, Department of Psychology II ‐ Social Psycholgy Julius‐Maximilians‐Universität Würzburg, corresponding author), Roland Deutsch (0000-0003-3523-7211, Department of Psychology II ‐ Social Psycholgy Julius‐Maximilians‐Universität Würzburg)
Year2025
Volume49
Issue3
Pagese70057-e70057
Publication date2025-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCognitive Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0364-0213 • E-ISSN: 1551-6709
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/cogs.70057
PMID40132075
OpenAlexW4408884453
LanguageEN
References cited55

Generic sentences such as “Birds lay eggs” are used frequently and effortlessly, but there is no simple quantitative rule that determines whether they are true or false. For instance, while “Birds lay eggs” is considered true, “Birds are female” is considered false, even though there are necessarily fewer birds that lay eggs than birds that are female. In this article, we adopt a cognitive perspective on genericity. Specifically, we draw on learning principles that predict asymmetries in the acquisition of category representations, which in turn might determine the acceptance of generic sentences. Our key hypotheses were that generics are more likely accepted when the attributes they refer to are distinctive (i.e., more prevalent in the category relative to comparison categories) and that this pattern is sensitive to the temporal order in which category information is acquired. We report three preregistered experiments to test these hypotheses. In all experiments, we employed a trait‐learning paradigm in which participants received information about exemplars of two fictitious kinds (human‐like sea creatures in Experiments 1–3, stones in Experiment 2) in sequential order. We manipulated the prevalence of attributes within kinds, as well as their status as being shared between kinds or distinctive for either the first‐ or second‐learned kind. As hypothesized, generic sentences were more likely accepted when referring to distinctive (vs. shared) attributes, but only for the second‐learned kind. We discuss implications for theories of generics as well as stereotype formation and representation

Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Creatures · Trait · Child and Animal Learning Development · Computer Science · Cultural Differences and Values · Psychology · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology · Artificial Intelligence

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