Bayesians Commit the Gambler's Fallacy

Datos Bibliográficos

ID7150328
AutoresKevin Dorst (0000-0003-3982-3242, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Año2026
Volumen50
Número1
Fecha de publicación2026-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaCognitive Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0364-0213 • E-ISSN: 1551-6709
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/cogs.70171
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas122

The gambler's fallacy is the tendency to expect random processes to switch more often than they actually do—for example, to assign a higher probability to heads after a streak of tails. It's often taken to be evidence for irrationality. It isn't. Rather, it's to be expected from a group of Bayesians who begin with causal uncertainty, and then observe unbiased data from an (in fact) statistically independent process. Although they increase their confidence that the outcomes are independent, they do so in an asymmetric way—ruling out “streaky” hypotheses more quickly than “switchy” ones. Their expectations depend on this balance of uncertainty; as a result, the majority (and the average) exhibit the gambler's fallacy, expecting a heads after a string of tails. If they have limited memory, this tendency persists even with arbitrarily‐large amounts of data. In fact, such Bayesians exhibit a variety of the empirical trends found in studies of the gambler's fallacy. They expect switches after short streaks but continuations after long ones; these nonlinear expectations vary with their familiarity with the causal system; their predictions depend on the sequence they've just seen; they produce sequences that are too switchy; and they exhibit greater rates of the gambler's fallacy in binary predictions than in probability estimates. In short: what's been thought to be evidence for irrationality may instead be rational responses to limited data and memory