The Pragmatics of Obscuring in Political Philosophy

Bibliographic Data

ID7157877
AuthorsStina Björkholm (0000-0003-0677-478X, Institute for Futures Studies Stockholm Sweden, corresponding author), Nicolas Olsson Yaouzis (0000-0003-0097-1790, Institute for Futures Studies Stockholm Sweden)
Year2025
Volume42
Issue3
Pages1039-1058
Publication date2025-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Applied Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0264-3758 • E-ISSN: 1468-5930
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/japp.70004
OpenAlexW4408959218
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited33

According to the obscuring objection against mainstream political philosophy, there has been a long‐standing dominant research paradigm focusing on distributive justice. This has made it difficult to call attention to important social facts, such as discrimination and oppression. The purpose of this article is not to defend the claim that mainstream political philosophy obscures important social facts. We instead focus on how obscuring arises. There are undoubtedly several different forces at play in the development of a research field, but the focus here is to spell out mechanisms that enforce obscuring which draw from influential theories in pragmatics. The account starts with the assumption that conversations are structured around mutual assumptions among interlocutors. We argue that the contents of these mutual assumptions represent certain general norms for efficient conversation and unequal social power among interlocutors, both of which constitute an important part of how obscuring arises

Epistemology · Linguistics · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Pragmatics · Sociology · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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