Is “Dysfunction” a Value-Neutral Concept
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7164591 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Somogy Vargas (0000-0001-9383-7843, Aarhus University, corresponding author), Andrew J Latham (0000-0001-8639-8053, Aarhus University) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 182 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 2313-2333 |
| Publication date | 2025-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-025-02359-z |
| OpenAlex | W4411499436 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 63 |
Two important issues in the philosophy of medicine are the evaluative issue (whether the concept of disease is value-laden) and the neutrality issue (whether the concept of dysfunction is value-laden). The aim of this study was to empirically examine whether a person’s evaluation of their own condition (i.e., patient evaluation) influences whether their condition is considered to be a disease and dysfunction. With respect to the evaluative issue, we observed, consistent with previous research, that patient evaluation does not influence people’s disease judgments, but it does influence their health judgments. Further, with respect to the neutrality issue , we observed that while patient evaluation does not influence people’s dysfunction judgments in physical conditions, it does influence their dysfunction judgments in mental conditions. Depending on exactly how these results are interpreted they might have potentially significant implications for dominant positions in the literature, particularly for those that claim to account for lay judgments. Progress in the philosophy of medicine might benefit from a shift in focus from the concepts of disease and health to a more detailed examination of the concept of dysfunction
Cognitive psychology · Disease · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Neutrality · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Value (mathematics) · Complementary and Alternative Medicine Studies · Medicine · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
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A Second Rebuttal On Health
What Counts as a Disease, and Why Does It Matter
Health, Disease, and the Medicalization of Low Sexual Desire
A plea for an experimental philosophy of medicine
Is health the absence of disease
Infertility, epistemic risk, and disease definitions
Health, Naturalism, and Functional Efficiency
In Defense of Proper Functions
Functions as Selected Effects
Health as a Theoretical Concept
The concept of mental disorder
Rethinking Health
Paracetamol, Poison, and Polio
Evolution, Dysfunction, and Disease
Classifying madness
The concepts of health and illness revisited
Conceptual Ethics I
Dual character concepts
Redefine statistical significance
Grounded Disease
Conceptual Ethics II
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |