Causal and non-causal explanations in theology

The case of Aquinas's primary–secondary causation distinction

Bibliographic Data

ID7166391
AuthorsI Silva (0000-0002-1419-688X, Austral University, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume61
IssueS2
PagesS267-S279
Publication date2025-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueReligious Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0034412523001166
OpenAlexW4391651993
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited17

The basic question of this article is whether Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of divine providence through his understanding of primary and secondary causation can be understood as a theological causal or non-causal explanation. To answer this question, I will consider some contemporary discussions about the nature of causal and non-causal explanations in philosophy of science and metaphysics, in order to integrate them into a theological discourse that appeals to the classical distinction between God as first cause and creatures as secondary causes to explain God's presence and providence in the created universe. My main argument will hold that, even if there are some philosophical models of explanation that seem to allow one to suggest that, at least partially, this doctrine could be seen as a non-causal theological explanation, there are other models that offer seemingly stronger reasons to see this doctrine in full as a causal theological explanation

Causality (physics) · Causation · Epistemology · Physics · Quantum mechanics · Theology · Historical Philosophy and Science · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Philosophy

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