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Competition in pay-as-bid auctions of divisible energy blocks

Theory and evidence from Chile

Bibliographic Data

ID7172908
AuthorsJose L Lima-Reyna (0000-0002-6856-5089, Clínica Las Condes, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume99
Pages102136
Publication date2026-04-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueUtilities Policy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0957-1787 • E-ISSN: 1878-4356
PublisherElsevier BV (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1016/j.jup.2025.102136
OpenAlexW7117114320
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited18

Common value auction · Electricity · Empirical evidence · Renewable energy · Supply · Supply shock · Auction Theory and Applications · Capital Investment and Risk Analysis · Electric Power System Optimization

  • Strategic withholding in descending clock capacity auctions

    Open Access•Chris Doyle•Utilities Policy•2026

  • Ratemaking under indexation

    Open Access•Fahad Abdullah, Muhammad Arsalan Aqeeq et al.•Utilities Policy•2026

  • A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

    Paul Milgrom, Paul R Milgrom et al.•Econometrica•1982

  • Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability

    Emily Oster•Journal of Business and Economic…•2019

  • What Really Matters in Auction Design

    Open Access•Paul Klemperer•The Journal of Economic…•2002

Citations per year2
Citation span2026 - 2026 (1)
Highly citedNo

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