Media Attention and Strategic Timing in Politics
Evidence from U.S. Presidential Executive Orders
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7236019 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Milena Djourelova (University of Chicago, corresponding author), Ruben Durante (0000-0003-2833-0063, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 813-834 |
| Publication date | 2021-12-29 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12683 |
| OpenAlex | W2986308845 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 29 |
Do politicians tend to adopt unpopular policies when the media and the public are distracted by other events? We examine this question by analyzing the timing of executive orders signed by U.S. presidents over the past four decades. We find robust evidence that executive orders are more likely to be signed on the eve of days when the news is dominated by other important stories that can crowd out coverage of executive orders. This relationship only holds in periods of divided government when unilateral presidential actions are more likely to be criticized by Congress. The effect is driven by executive orders that are more likely to make the news and to attract negative publicity, particularly those on topics on which president and Congress disagree. Finally, the timing of executive orders appears to be related to predictable news but not unpredictable ones, which suggests it results from a deliberate and forward‐looking PR strategy
Business · Executive branch · Executive order · Executive summary · Government (linguistics · Newspaper · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Public relations · Publicity · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Psychology · Public Administration
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Avoiding distraction
Strategic timing of disclosure in belief formation
Disastrous Discretion
Losing on the Home Front? Battlefield Casualties, Media, and Public Support for Foreign Interventions
Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention
Energy versus safety
Presidential policymaking, 1877–2020
Divided Government, Strategic Substitution, and Presidential Unilateralism
Losing on the home front? Battlefield casualties, media, and public support for foreign interventions
Power without Persuasion
Bending the Rules
The presidential power of unilateral action
Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention
The political economy of government responsiveness
News Droughts, News Floods, and U. S. Disaster Relief
Exposing Corrupt Politicians
How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force
The Contextual Determinants of Support for Unilateral Action
The Specter of Supreme Court Criticism
Public Opinion Toward Presidential Power
Attack When the World Is Not Watching? US News and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Press Coverage and Political Accountability
Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking
Unilateral Powers, Public Opinion, and the Presidency
Text as Data
Legislative Constraints, Ideological Conflict, and the Timing of Executive Unilateralism
Political Timing
Gubernatorial use of executive orders
Mobilizing the Public Against the President
Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual? The Factors Shaping Public Support for Unilateral Action
The Public Cost of Unilateral Action
The Elusive Search for Presidential Power
Does Public Opinion Constrain Presidential Unilateralism
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |