Algeria's pseudo-democratic politics

Lessons for democratization in the Middle East

Bibliographic Data

ID7279784
AuthorsFrédéric Volpi (0000-0002-7642-8084, University of St Andrews, corresponding author)
Year2006
Volume13
Issue3
Pages442-455
Publication date2006-05-31
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueDemocratization (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1351-0347 • E-ISSN: 1743-890X
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13510340600579342
OpenAlexW1968916916
LanguageEN
Citations received15

This account proposes an analytical framework to understand recent developments in Algerian politics, such as the 2004 presidential election, in the context of the rise of pseudo-democratic regimes throughout the Muslim world. It suggests that through the tactical adaptation of the powers-that-be to the demands of electoral democracy, the substantive value and the legitimacy of democracy as a concept and a practical system of governance is being eroded. The key tactics employed by the regime to entrench this pseudo-democratic model include the informal pre-selection of the candidates, the stage-management of the election campaign and the televised media, and poll fixing and electoral demobilization. This domestic evolution of pseudo-democratic politics occurs in a propitious international context where the combination of economic (oil) and security (terrorism) concerns favours trends towards short-term domestic stability at the expense of long-term democratic transformation. Keywords: pseudo-democracyelectoral democracyauthoritarian practicesgovernance Notes 1. Quoted in Le Monde (Paris), 17 April 2004. 2. See, for example, William B. Quandt, 'Algeria's Uneasy Peace', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2002), pp. 15–23; Ray Takeyh, 'Islamism in Algeria: A Struggle between Hope and Agony', Middle East Policy, Vol. X, No. 2 (2003), pp. 62–75. 3. In the aftermath of Bouteflika's victory, the White House issued a press release stating: 'the President congratulates President Bouteflika on his re-election. These elections represent another step on the road toward democracy in Algeria. The President also congratulates the Algerian people for their dedication to building a democratic political system' (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 9 April 2004). On 3 July 2004, on Algeria's independence day, President Bush also sent a more explicit message of support to President Bouteflika congratulating him on the progress that the country made toward democracy, and on the role that Algeria played in the war on terror. Large excerpts from the letter were reprinted in the Algerian press. See El Moudjahid (Algiers), 3 July 2004; El Watan (Algiers), 4 July 2004. 4. See Frédéric Volpi, Islam and Democracy: The Failure of Dialogue in Algeria (London: Pluto Press, 2003); Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History (New York: New York University Press, 1999); William Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998); Graham Fuller, Algeria: The Next Fundamentalist State? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996). 5. See William Zartman, 'The Military in the Politics of Succession: Algeria', in J. W. Harbeson (ed.), The Military in African Politics (New York: Praeger, 1987), pp. 21–47. 6. Algerian oil and gas is mainly exported to neighbouring European countries such as France, Italy and Spain, as well as the United States. See Economist Intelligence Unit, Algeria: Country Risk (EIU: London, 2004); Giacomo Luciani, 'The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratization', in Ghassan Salamé (ed.), Democracy without Democrats (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), pp. 130–155. 7. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2005 (New York: UNDP, 2005). 8. There is a subtext to this version of events that introduces the role of intra-elite competition within the regime, namely, the instrumental utilization of democratic reforms by the faction led by Chadli in order to undermine the leadership ambitions of other factions. See Michael Willis, 'Containing Radicalism through the Political Process in North Africa', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2006), pp. 136–148. This manipulative tradition can also be seen as one of the antecedents of the contemporary pseudo-democratic model in the country, not least because some of the political players involved are the same. 9. Francesco Cavatorta, 'The Failed Liberalisation of Algeria and the International Context: A Legacy of Stable Authoritarianism', Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 7, No. (2002), pp. 23–43. 10. Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War 1990–1998, trans. J. Derrick (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 11. Frédéric Volpi, 'Democratisation and its Enemies: The Algerian Transition to Authoritarianism', in R. Luckham and G. Cawthra (eds), Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies (London: Zed Books, 2003), pp. 155–180. 12. Mustafa Barth, 'Sand Castles in the Sahara: US Military Basing in Algeria', Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 30, No. 98 (2003), pp. 679–85. 13. The Senate must ratify the laws proposed by the National Assembly by a quorum of three quarters of the chamber to grant them legislative power. Because presidential appointees constitute a third of the Senate, they are able to block any law by acting in concert See Constitution de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, No. 76, 8 December 1996 (especially Part 2, Chapter 2, Article 120). 14. The official results are published in the Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, No. 24, 18 April 2004. 15. Robert Mortimer, 'Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian War', Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1996), pp. 18–39. 16. Quandt (note 2), p. 19. 17. Interestingly, in some circumstances this balancing act can be initiated by the Islamic camp itself, as witnessed in neighbouring Morocco where the Justice and Development Party decided not to put forward candidates in all the electoral circumscriptions for the 2002 legislative elections, for fear of upsetting the regime and triggering repression against its members. See Michael Willis, 'Morocco's Islamists and the Legislative Elections of 2002: The Strange Case of the Party that Did Not Want to Win', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2004), pp. 53–81. 18. See the interview of the FFS spokesperson, Karim Tabbou, in L'Expression (Algiers), 13 March 2004. 19. There was a quasi-farcical episode in the run-up to the election, involving a break-in the Constitutional Court, which led to the elimination of the candidature of Taleb Ibrahimi amid complaints of irregularities voiced by the Wafa party and the press. See Le Matin (Algiers), 7 March 2004; Libération (Paris), 6 April 2004. 20. See the analysis of Daniel Schneidermann in Libération (Paris), 16 April 2004. 21. Of the 3000 or so electoral meetings that were held for this election, more than 2000 were organized by Bouteflika's campaign organization; the remaining five candidates between themselves did not manage to reach half that – with Benflis coming second best with just over 600 meetings organized. See Hamid Grine, Chronique d'une Élection Pas Comme les Autres (Algiers: Alpha Design Editions, 2004). 22. Le Matin (Algiers), 31 March 2004. 23. Quoted in The New York Times, 25 January 2004. 24. The recent example of Bosnia shows that the emergence of a new political debate is difficult to engineer even when the international community ensures impartiality in the utilization of the national media. See Carrie Manning and Miljenko Antic, 'The Limits of Electoral Engineering', Journal of Democracy Vol. 14, No. 3 (2003), pp. 45–59. 25. In the 1999 presidential election, the official turnout was announced at over 60 per cent and Bouteflika received over 70 per cent of the votes. Another embarrassing incident took place earlier during the 1997 parliamentary elections, when poll rigging by members of the local administration at several voting stations was casually caught on camera by foreign TV crews covering the event. See Volpi (note 4). 26. L'Expression (Algiers), 10 April 2004. 27. See Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, No. 24, 18 April 2004. 28. El Watan (Algiers), 9 April 2004. 29. L'Expression (Algiers), 10 April 2004. 30. Le Monde (Paris), 9 April 2004. 31. El Watan (Algiers), 10 April 2004. 32. Le Jeune Indépendant (Algiers), 11 April 2004. 33. The continuation of electoral fraud by political players linked to previous authoritarian regimes has been well studied in new Latin American democracies. See Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson, 'Old Parties and New Democracies: Do They Bring Out the Best in One Another?', Party Politics, Vol. 7, No. 5 (2001), pp. 581–604. For early trends in Algeria, see Youcef Bouandel, 'Political Parties and the Transition from Authoritarianism: The Case of Algeria', Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 41, No. (2003), pp. 1–22. 34. Quoted in El Watan (Algiers), 21 December 2003 35. Quandt (note 2). 36. Quoted in Le Matin (Algiers), 18 June 2003. 37. Thomas Carothers, 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2002), pp. 5–21; Larry Diamond, 'Thinking about Hybrid Regimes', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2002), pp. 21–35; Daniel Brumberg, 'The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2002), pp. 46–68; Frédéric Volpi, 'Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4 (2004), pp. 1061–78. 38. See, for example, Jillian Schwedler, 'Don't Blink. Jordan's Democratic Opening and Closing', Middle East Report Online, July 3, 2002. 39. Quandt (note 2), p. 22; Dankwart Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model', Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1970), pp. 1033–53. 40. El Watan (Algiers), 21 December 2003. 41. The declaration of the French Defence Minister is available at: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/communiques/2004/i190704/190704.htm. 42. For the French interpretation of these developments see Libération (Paris), 14 July 2004, Le Monde (Paris), 15 July 2004, Le Monde, 17 July 2004, Libération, 19 July 2004, Le Monde, 20 July 2004. For an Algerian perspective see Le Quotidien d'Oran (Oran), 14 July 2004; El Watan (Algiers), 17 July 2004; Liberté (Algiers), 17 July 2004; El Watan, 18 July 2004. 43. The newly promoted Generals were Habib Chentouf (first military region), Saïd Bey (second region), Saïd Chanegriha (third region) and Abderahmane Kamel (fifth region). In addition, General Salah Ahmed Gaïd became Chief of Staff, General Ahmed Tafer was promoted Head of the Land Forces and General Ahmed Senhadji was nominated General Secretary of the Defence Ministry. Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, No. 24, 18 April 2004

Democracy · Democracy promotion · Democratization · Middle East · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics · Islamic Studies and History · Law · Political and Social Issues

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