Outsourcing elderly care to private companies in Russia
(Non)compliance and Creative Compliance as Responses to the Principal-Agent Problem
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7281373 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anna Tarasenko (0000-0002-8803-4509, National Research University Higher School of Economics, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 80-100 |
| Publication date | 2022-11-04 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | East European Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2159-9165 • E-ISSN: 2159-9173 |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/21599165.2022.2139683 |
| OpenAlex | W4308205878 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 28 |
Why do regions (non)comply or creatively comply in response to federal-driven reforms in Russia? This article studies the interplay of interests and incentives prompted by a contract between a principal and agents on the one hand, and shaped by the regional socio-economic context on the other. The analysis proved that the incapacity of the public sector to satisfy the societal demand for services in urbanised areas encouraged compliance. The creative compliance results from a need to demonstrate commitment to the reform in regions with a lack of favourable conditions. Non-compliance is adopted in ethnic republics and in relatively poor regions
Business · Compliance (psychology · Context (archaeology · Economic growth · Economics · Ethnic group · Incentive · Market economy · Outsourcing · Political science · Principal (computer security · Private sector · Law · Taxation and Compliance Studies · Marketing
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses
The Routledge International Handbook to Welfare State Systems
Legitimacy and Compliance in Criminal Justice
Childbirth is not a car rental’
Performance incentives and economic growth
Welfare Restructuring in Russia since 2012
Opportunities and Constraints of Authoritarian Modernisation
Exploring Varieties of Governance in Russia
Russian Non-Profit Organisations in Service Delivery
Compliance Construction in the Context of Environmental Regulation
Reform of in-kind benefits in Russia
Institutional Variation Among Russian Regional Regimes
Organizing Civil Society in Russia and China
Subnational Governance in Russia
Faking performance together
Agents or Stewards
Compliance Regimes and Barriers to Behavioral Change
Shock-Resistant Authoritarianism
The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models
Elite recruitment and state-society relations in technocratic authoritarian regimes
The Politics of Service Delivery Reform
Welfare Regimes, Policy Reforms, and Hybridity
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |