National Responses to Transnational Terrorism

Intelligence and Counterterrorism Provision

Datos Bibliográficos

ID7312812
AutoresThomas Jensen (University of Copenhagen), Thomas Wiben Jensen (0000-0003-1428-4414, University of Copenhagen, autor de correspondencia)
Año2014
Volumen60
Número3
Páginas530-554
Fecha de publicación2014-08-14
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0022002714545221
OpenAlexW2761247932
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas20

Intelligence about transnational terrorism is generally gathered by national agencies. I set up and analyze a game-theoretic model to study the implications of national intelligence gathering for the provision of domestic (defensive) counterterrorism when two countries are facing a common transnational terrorist threat. It is shown that, relative to a benchmark case where all intelligence is known by both countries, national intelligence gathering often leads to increased inefficiencies in counterterrorism provision. By extending the main model with a communication stage, I also explore whether the differences in information that may follow from national intelligence gathering will be overcome by intelligence sharing. If verifiable sharing is a viable option for each country, then full credible intelligence sharing can happen in equilibrium. On the other hand, if only cheap talk communication is possible, then it cannot

Benchmark (surveying · Computer security · Economics · Intelligence analysis · Political science · Public relations · Set (abstract data type · Terrorism · Verifiable secret sharing · Computer Science · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence