Nationalization and Privatization
A Rational-Choice Perspective on Efficiency
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 7322912 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Ellen M Pint (autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 1990 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 267-298 |
| Data de publicação | 1990-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Public Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0143-814X • E-ISSN: 1469-7815 |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0143814x00005833 |
| OpenAlex | W1963888650 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 5 |
| Referências citadas | 12 |
This paper analyzes the use of nationalization and privatization policies to redistribute costs and benefits among interest groups, using a rational-choice framework. The major cases considered are the post-war nationalizations and the current wave of privatizations in the United Kingdom, plus France and the United States. The analysis indicates that governments tend to redistribute benefits to more concentrated interest groups, such as organized labor or shareholders, and to impose costs on more diffuse groups, such as consumers and taxpayers. This type of redistribution is often economically inefficient, but politically efficient for the party in power. Policy design is also influenced by the ease with which policies can be changed by future governments within the prevailing political institutions
Business · Corporate governance · Economic policy · Economic system · Economics · Market economy · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Public economics · Redistribution (election · Shareholder · Agricultural Economics and Policy · Finance · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Social Policy and Reform Studies
Privatization
An economic theory of democracy
The Logic of Collective Action
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Congress
Uncle Sam's Private, Profitseeking Corporations
Privatisation and Regulation
The Nationalisation of British Industry, 1945-51
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action
| Obras citantes distintas | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,17 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1996 - 2016 (21) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 4 |