The Effect of Formal and Informal Contracting Mechanisms on Implementation Performance in the U.S. Federalist System

Dados Bibliográficos

ID7332003
AutoresJessica N Terman, Jessica Terman (0000-0001-9364-024X, George Mason University, autor correspondente), Richard C Feiock, Richard Feiock (0000-0001-5215-0391, Florida State University)
Ano2015
Volume42
Fascículo2
Páginas309-331
Data de publicação2015-11-20
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoLocal Government Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0300-3930 • E-ISSN: 1743-9388
EditoraTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/03003930.2015.1110522
OpenAlexW2270785544
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3
Referências citadas50

The relationship between contract management capacity and implementation success in local government contracting is well established. However, less is known about how specific contract mechanisms are linked to this success. This study uses implementation of the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program to examine the use of formal and informal contract management techniques in the implementation of energy projects. The use of formal contract mechanisms, such as full and open competitive bidding, contact rescission and outcome-based performance measures, exhibits a statistically significant effect on implementation performance. The findings advance contracting theory and have practical implications for local government contracting and implementation success in fiscal federalism

Bidding · Business · Dilemma · Economics · Federalist · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Local government · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Rescission · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Public Procurement and Policy · Public-Private Partnership Projects · Marketing