Incommensurability and moral value

Bibliographic Data

ID7353987
AuthorsMark R Reiff (0000-0003-1892-6357, University of Manchester, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume13
Issue3
Pages237-268
Publication date2013-05-31
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitics Philosophy & Economics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1470-594X • E-ISSN: 1741-3060
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/1470594x13483481
OpenAlexW2115175248
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited27

Some theorists believe that there is a plurality of values, and that in many circumstances these values are incommensurable, or at least incomparable. Others believe that all values are reducible to a single super-value, or that even if there is a plurality of irreducible values these values are commensurable. But I will argue that both sides have got it wrong. Values are neither commensurable nor incommensurable, at least not in the way most people think. We are free to believe in incommensurability or not, depending on what particular conception of morality we want to embrace. Incommensurability is accordingly not a theory about value. It is a presupposition that provides a necessary background condition for a certain kind of value to exist. It is therefore not the kind of view that can be morally true or false. As a presupposition, it can only be accepted or rejected on grounds that do not presuppose that morality already exists. Incommensurability is, like the rejection of hard determinism, one of the presuppositions on which morality as we know it happens to be based

Determinism · Epistemology · Morality · Presupposition · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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