Against acceptance theories of social norms
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7354316 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Lawle (0000-0003-0270-934X, Illinois State University, Normal, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Publication date | 2025-08-06 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Politics Philosophy & Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1470-594X • E-ISSN: 1741-3060 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1470594x251364823 |
| OpenAlex | W4413004845 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 12 |
According to some theories, a rule counts as a social norm within a community only if the members of the community generally accept the rule. This is a conceptual claim: proponents of these theories do not deny that a rule can structure people's interactions and relationships even though few people accept it; they simply deny that such a rule should count as a social norm. I argue that this approach draws arbitrary boundaries that cut through explanatorily significant categories with no theoretical payoff. We typically invoke social norms either to explain empirical phenomena (e.g. what people do ) or moral phenomena (e.g. what people should do). In both domains, “acceptance theories” of social norms do not define a category of rules that warrants distinctive attention. On an alternative approach, a rule counts as a social norm as long as people cooperate with expressive practices representing the rule as valid, whether they accept the rule or not. I argue that “practice theories” of social norms are more fruitful, and so we should abandon “acceptance theories
Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Positive economics · Social acceptance · Sociology · Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Social Influence · Social Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
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