On the meta-ethical status of constructivism

Reflections on G.A. Cohen's `Facts and Principles

Bibliographic Data

ID7354348
AuthorsMiriam Ronzoni (0000-0002-5280-8744, European University Institute), Laura Valentini (0000-0002-5782-5164, The Queen's College, Oxford, UK)
Year2008
Volume7
Issue4
Pages403-422
Publication date2008-10-13
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitics Philosophy & Economics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1470-594X • E-ISSN: 1741-3060
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/1470594x08095751
OpenAlexW2132638625
LanguageEN
Citations received20

In his article `Facts and Principles', G.A. Cohen attempts to refute constructivist approaches to justification by showing that, contrary to what their proponents claim, fundamental normative principles are fact- insensitive. We argue that Cohen's `fact-insensitivity thesis' does not provide a successful refutation of constructivism because it pertains to an area of meta-ethics which differs from the one tackled by constructivists. While Cohen's thesis concerns the logical structure of normative principles, constructivists ask how normative principles should be justified. In particular, their claim that justified fundamental normative principles are fact-sensitive follows from a commitment to agnosticism about the existence of objective moral facts. We therefore conclude that, in order to refute constructivism, Cohen would have to address questions of justification, and take a stand on those long-standing meta-ethical debates about the ontological status of moral notions (for example, realism versus anti-realism) with respect to which he himself wants to remain agnostic

Agnosticism · Constructivism (international relations · Epistemology · International relations · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Normative · Political science · Politics · Realism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub