American Federalism and Intergovernmental Management

Timothy J. Conlan and Paul L. Posner, eds., Intergovernmental Management for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). 368 pp. $28.95 (paper), ISBN: 9780815715412. On February 4, 2009, President Barack Obama signed a law to expand the Children’s Health Insurance Program. This measure promised states an additional $33 billion in federal funds over four and a half years to provide health insurance to 4 million more low-income children. About two weeks later, the president signed a massive $787 billion stimulus bill to help the United States cope with its most dire economic crisis since the Great Depression. Of this sum, about 36 percent, or $280 billion, would flow to states and localities to administer promptly and accountably. In the face of these major developments, Intergovernmental Management for the 21st Century could hardly be more important and timely. Timothy J. Conlan and Paul L. Posner have masterfully assembled 14 experts on federalism and implementation to join them in assaying the institutional, policy, and administrative challenges of our compound republic. The editors sort the contributions to this 15-chapter book into three main sections, with part I focused on framing the intergovernmental debate. Richard P. Nathan gets this section off to a strong start by providing historical perspective on theories of federalism. He provocatively challenges the Leviathan theory, which holds that the interstate tax and economic competition embedded in federalism keeps government smaller than otherwise would be the case. Nathan argues that, to the contrary, “the unabashedly opportunistic and dynamic character of American federalism has abetted governmental growth” (21). Following Nathan, Conlan beams his analytic spotlight on the metaphors of federalism. As anyone who has ever taken an introductory course in American government knows, marble cake has been the reigning federalism metaphor for more than four decades. In an intellectually playful and original way, Conlan suggests that “it is time to close down the intergovernmental bakery” (27) and turn to the natural sciences for illuminating metaphors. He demonstrates the advantages of three geological perspectives on federalism—sedimentary, metamorphic, and igneous. Part I concludes with an extensive treatment of intergovernmental finance in the new global economy by Raymond C. Scheppach and Frank Shafroth. The two authors diagnose the condition of the intergovernmental budget and tax frameworks and call for rethinking both. I found their analysis of tax federalism, especially the problems generated for the states by federal policy makers, to be particularly insightful and troubling. Part II of the book deftly scrutinizes the challenges of intergovernmental management in five important policy areas—homeland security (Charles R. Wise and Rania Nader), education (Kenneth K. Wong), welfare (Jocelyn M. Johnston), Medicaid (Carol S. and William G. Weissert), and global climate change (Barry G. Rabe). The chapters forge a strong foundation for comparing issues of intergovernmental relations and management and suggest the complexities of generalizing across policy spheres. Themes of reaction to crisis, fragmentation, the questionable targeting of resources, and the obstacles to performance measurement permeate the chapter on homeland security. In the case of education, the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act signaled the rise of a more assertive federal government. The introduction of a centrally imposed performance measurement and management system fueled intergovernmental conflict. In contrast, the chapters on welfare, Medicaid, and global warming offer variations on a devolution theme. Johnston sees the welfare reform law of 1996 as an incremental movement toward “dubious devolution” (140). While states have won new flexibility, she points to the federal government’s propensity to recategorize the block grant in the name of accountability. Performance measures in the form of federally imposed work participation rates for welfare recipients shape state behavior. The chapters on Medicaid and global warming present more vivid cases of devolution. Weissert and Weissert perceptively analyze the role of federal waivers in Medicaid, the program that accounts for nearly half of all federal grants to states and localities. The use of Medicaid and other waivers reached unprecedented levels during the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Many states have used the discretion that waivers provide to reinvent their Medicaid programs. In turn, global climate policy represents a case of federalism from the bottom up. Rabe shows that in the face of disengagement and opposition by the George W. Bush administration, regional associations of states launched meaningful initiatives to cope with this problem. (The degree to which the Obama administration’s cap-and-trade initiative ultimately alters this pattern waits to unfold.) Part III of the volume proffers five chapters that engage issues of governance in the intergovernmental system. The two opening contributions, by Shelley H. Metzenbaum and Beryl A. Radin, set forth contrasting perspectives on intergovernmental performance measurement and management. Metzenbaum deplores the extent to which states often fail to live up to their billing as the policy laboratories of democracy. To counter this tendency, she contends that federal agencies “need to be learning leaders” in their dealings with states and localities (209). In this vein, they “need to shift their emphasis from conducting oversight to generating outcome-focused, evidence based insights” (210). This necessitates that these agencies do more to impose uniform measurement strategies on the states and build their own analytic capacities. Radin casts a more skeptical eye on efforts to promulgate a performance-based approach across a broad range of intergovernmental programs. Among other things, she notes that states often have the upper hand in their dealings with the national government on performance issues and frequently strive to preserve their unique data systems. She counsels that performance management works best when it is “modest in reach and sensitive to the unique qualities surrounding” particular grant programs. Otherwise, a broad federal initiative to implant performance-based accountability could well backfire, fueling intergovernmental conflict and eroding trust between levels of government (261). Part III then turns to two policy tools that frequently preoccupy students of intergovernmental relations—block grants and mandates. Carl W. Stenberg illuminates how block grants have evolved from a tool for surmounting categorical stovepipes into a vehicle for cutting federal financial support for the states. He underscores the potent forces fueling the proliferation of categorical grants. He then adroitly presents eight sobering lessons that flow from the country’s experience with block grants. For instance, despite claims of block grant proponents, he finds little evidence that they achieve administrative cost savings. For his part, Posner contends that over the last four decades, federal mandates and preemptions have become the primary intergovernmental tools. He sees this as contributing to a centralizing politics of coercive federalism. In the section’s concluding chapter, Troy E. Smith offers little hope that the intergovernmental lobby will do much to check this trend toward centralization. This lobby consists of state and local officials acting individually and through their associations to shape policy outcomes at the national level. Smith notes, for instance, that not only do governors participate in the National Governors Association, but more than two-thirds of them have offices in Washington to promote their interests. Smith analyzes multiple factors that lead states to be opportunistic in their representation before federal policy makers rather than “principled defenders of [their] structural responsibilities” under federalism (323). Overall, this book stands as a major contribution to the literature of American federalism and intergovernmental management. It covers a spectrum of important topics in an informed, original, and engaging way. Moreover, it dodges the perennial problem of edited volumes—the tendency for one or two chapters to lag well behind the others in quality. Each chapter impressively marshals evidence and develops key propositions. The tensions that exist among the perspectives embedded in different chapters add to its intellectual zest. My chief reservation about the book centers on the editors’ thesis in their concluding chapter that American federalism is moving from a “supportive and collaborative model to a more coercive, opportunistic” one (342). In particular, the term “coercive” seems to me to exaggerate the power and dominance of the national government. At least four factors suggest that the states do better at securing representation of their interests in the intergovernmental system than this term implies.1 First, coercive federalism tends to connote a zero-sum contest between the national government and the states when, in fact, federal policies often empower both. This view squares with Nathan’s contention that opportunistic federalism means more government involvement in society at all levels. Second, the term “coercive” underplays the importance of implementation as a major vehicle for representing state preferences. As the editors acknowledge, the federal government often lacks the capacity and will to ensure that states and localities comply with its mandates. The hollowing out of the national government through personnel reductions and other developments has further limited its ability to monitor and control state and local implementing agents. Students of network management and policy implementation find very little hierarchy when the federal government relies on the states to administer its programs. When differences between government levels come to a head they tend to get resolved through bargaining and negotiation. Furthermore, federal officials at times launch major devolutionary initiatives via the implementation process. As Weissert and Weissert underscore in their chapter, federal waivers have become major vehicles for empowering states to reinvent their Medicaid programs.2 The use of waivers in other policy spheres should be a research priority. Third, one should guard against equating coercive with any policy that centralizes more authority or responsibility in the national government. At times, significant numbers of state officials see benefits in centralization (e.g., having the federal government assume responsibility for all health care needs of the elderly rather than leaving a big part of this expensive problem to the states). Hence, a more definitive empirical test of the “coercive federalism” hypothesis would entail examining the degree to which the national government has adopted or preserved policies over the objection of major coalitions of state officials (especially governors). Finally, the emphasis on coercive federalism does not adequately acknowledge the kind of bottom-up developments that Rabe describes in his chapter on state actions to combat global warming. To this case, one might add the rising importance of aggressive state attorneys general in shaping policies concerning smoking, the regulation of Wall Street, and the like. These reservations about coercive federalism should in no way detract from my strong appreciation and endorsement of this book. It is a must-read for any serious student of federalism and intergovernmental management

Economics · Federalism · Framing (construction · Great Depression · Law and economics · New Federalism · Political science · Politics · Sociology · History · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Policy Transfer and Learning · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies

• Federalism by Waiver

  Faye J Thompson, Courtney Burke•Publius The Journal of Federalism•2008

  Add to list