Market structure and disempowering regulatory intermediaries
Insights from U.S. trade surveillance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7366892 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Miles Kellerman (0000-0003-0602-5391, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1350-1369 |
| Publication date | 2020-02-14 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Regulation & Governance (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1748-5983 • E-ISSN: 1748-5991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/rego.12305 |
| OpenAlex | W3005845852 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 46 |
Public agencies outsource a wide variety of tasks to nonstate actors, or what can be referred to as regulatory intermediaries. In certain circumstances, these agencies may seek to disempower those regulatory intermediaries by reclaiming, duplicating, or transferring the outsourced task. When will these disempowerment attempts be successful? This article presents the Market Structure Hypothesis, which contends that the level of competition between regulatory intermediaries will, all things equal, determine whether disempowerment attempts succeed. To test this hypothesis, this article examines the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's attempts to acquire the independent capacity to conduct nationwide trade surveillance in the 1980s (Market Oversight Surveillance System) and 2010s (Consolidated Audit Trail). Evidence derives from archival materials, a Freedom of Information Act Request, and 60 interviews in Oxford, London, Toronto, New York City, and Washington, DC. The empirical results corroborate the hypothesis' expectations, contributing to our understanding of public‐private partnerships and shedding new empirical light on an understudied topic of securities regulation
Audit · Business · Commission · Competition (biology · Economics · Empirical evidence · Freedom of information · Intermediary · Outsourcing · Political science · Public relations · Global trade, sustainability, and social impact · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Accounting · Finance · Marketing
Process-Tracing Methods
Models of Bounded Rationality
The Politics of Presidential Appointments
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Law, Surveillance, and Financial Markets
Reluctant partners
Nyse Fixed Commission Rates
Big audit firms as regulatory intermediaries in transnational labor governance
Competence versus control
To Judge Leviathan
The Politicization of Regulatory Agencies
The Enemy of My Enemy
Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest
Understanding Process Tracing
The Taming of the Stew
Asymmetry in Empowering and Disempowering Private Intermediaries
Theorizing Regulatory Intermediaries
Brighter and Darker Sides of Intermediation
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |