Local Politics and International Agreement
The Case of Government Procurement in the U.S. States
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7395382 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dong-Hun Kim (0000-0002-0813-2660, Oakland University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 79-101 |
| Publication date | 2009-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | State Politics & Policy Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1532-4400 • E-ISSN: 1946-1607 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/153244000900900104 |
| OpenAlex | W2029743384 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 30 |
This article examines the responses of sub-national governments to international agreements that severely reduce their policy discretion. I focus on their decision to subject public procurement to international competition by joining the Agreement of Government Procurement (GPA) of the World Trade Organization. In a public procurement market, a government becomes both a market participant and a market regulator. I argue that the propensity of governments to join the GPA, thus reducing their discretion as market regulators, depends on the degree of local political competition. Studying state governments in the United States, I find that the degree of political competition positively affects not only the propensity to join the GPA but also the amount of procurement that a government subjects to international competition
Business · Competition (biology · Discretion · Economics · Government (linguistics · Government procurement · International economics · International trade · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Procurement · Public economics · State (computer science · Corruption and Economic Development · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration · Public Procurement and Policy · Marketing
Total Lobbying
The Economic Effects of Constitutions
Term Limits in State Legislatures
Deliberate Discretion?
Politics in the American States
Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits
Tax and Expenditure Limitations and State and Local Fiscal Structure
The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections
The Causes of Fiscal Transparency
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
The Political Economy of Corruption
Corruption and Government
Corruption
The causes of corruption
The economic effects of constitutions
Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement
I Seen My Opportunities and I Took 'Em
Fiscal Transparency, Gubernatorial Approval, and the Scale of Government
Evolution in State Governance Structures
The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States
Severing the Electoral Connection
Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries
Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production
Local Government and Global Politics
Electoral Competition in the American States
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2020 (7) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |