Party Differences in State Budget Outcomes Are There After All
Response to “Reexamining the Dynamic Model of Divided Partisan Government
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7409175 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James E Alt, James Ε Alt (Harvard University Press), Robert C Lowry (0000-0002-1330-4762, Iowa State University) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 65 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 491-497 |
| Publication date | 2003-05-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3816 • E-ISSN: 1468-2508 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-2508.t01-2-00011 |
| OpenAlex | W2139762216 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 2 |
Alt and Lowry (2000) show that Democrats generally target more of state income for public budgets than do Republicans, though exact party positions vary from state to state, and unified governments adjust faster than divided. McAtee, Yackee, and Lowery (2003) question these results. However, their estimated revenue changes ignore income shares, usually set independent variables equal to sample rather than subsample means, and omit some fixed effects. Modeling short-run changes during transitions must take note of different conditions under which different partisan configurations assume power. When their estimates do this, predicted revenue changes relative to income line up as we expected. Their analysis raises other issues regarding polarization and the distribution of partisan configurations across space and time that merit further investigation
Demographic economics · Econometrics · Economics · Government (linguistics · Polarization (electrochemistry · Public economics · Revenue · Sample (material · State (computer science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Finance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Mathematics
| Citations per year | 0.29 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2009 - 2018 (10) |
| Highly cited | No |