Archaeology or interpretation

On February 2, 1983, during his lecture at Collège de France, Michel Foucault criticizes the concept of the political (le politique). According to Foucault, the shift from politics (la politique) to the political masks "the specific problem and set of problems of politics, of dunasteia, of the practice of the political game, and of the political game as a field of experience with its rules and normativity, of the political game as experience inasmuch as it is indexed to truth-telling and involves a certain relationship to oneself and to others for its players" (2010, p. 159). According to Foucault, le politique is an unnecessary dimension of transcendence that covers the comprehension of politics in its relationship between dunasteia and politeia. The first term indicates the constitutional framework that defines the statute of citizens and their rights, as the rules of the political game. The second, instead, names the actual exercise of power, the political game as it happens, as experience. These two spheres determine what politics is in a democratic society. Therefore, the dimension of the political is not necessary at all and hides politics as actual experience. Foucault's text is an explicit attack on the positions of Claude Lefort, who in those same years worked on defining his theory of the political. According to Lefort, le politique shows the structure of modern and democratic society on which the actual rules of politics depend. It is the name of a symbolic dimension, a framework of references, that explains the difference of modern society to the society of the Ancien regime, which is marked by a religious and organic structure. In other words, if an external and transcendent reference founded premodern society, the political is the characteristic of modern societies without foundation. In the latter, conflict replaces an already impossible unity. These views of the concept of the political illustrate a divergent theoretical framework, a different conception of modernity and democracy. They are two different theories that indicate the presence as well as trajectories of 20th-century French philosophy, of which Foucault and Lefort can be considered among the most significant proponents. The philosophical and personal paths of these two authors are the clearest examples of this bipolarity. If the first offers a microphysics of power, as a dispersion and as a relation, in Lefort's theory, power is as a symbolic pole, an unreachable otherness that organizes the entire social field. If Foucault highlights the disciplinary mechanisms and methods of subjectivity that inaugurate the age classique, Lefort devotes himself to the definition of modernity as the emergence of a society marked by uncertainty, by the loss of a transcendent foundation. However, the milieu in which such different theories emerge appears extraordinarily similar. Structuralism and the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Lacan delimit the common ground from which both reflections take shape. In this sense, the oppositional relationship I described appears reductive and contact points instead quickly emerge: the critique of structuralism, a theory of history that rejects any teleology and any presupposed continuity, a reading of the social field that does not admit transcendence, and the common reference to phenomenology. From this perspective, the works of Foucault and Lefort stay in a shared semantic space where they are mutually understandable. To fully understand the opposition between these two authors, in its contingency and in its theoretical foundations, it is necessary to take a step back and analyze their respective positions from the 1960s. In this way, it is possible to discover a series of polemical references indicating two ways of analyzing the social that clash in French cultural debate of the 1970s and the 1980s. The first aim of this essay is to reconstruct the relationship between these two authors and their respective theories, inaugurating an exploratory examination. Following the few and not always explicit references scattered in both works, I identify the problematic points around which the dialogue between Lefort and Foucault orbits. This dialogue is mostly polemical, addressing harsh and occasionally deceptive criticism leveled by both toward each another. It will be necessary to distinguish between the personal and historical reasons for these oppositions in order to be able to draw what is at stake for theory beneath the respective polemics. Moreover, following this comparison, never attempted until now, I will try to highlight the peculiarities of Lefort's thought and its potential in the current debate. In 1972, Lefort, after more than a decade of research, publishes his main work, Le travail de l'œuvre, Machiavel, analyzing the major texts of the Florentine Secretary (Lefort, 1972, 2012).11 The only English version, titled Machiavelli In The Making, is partial and does not include some initial chapters. Through the analysis of The Prince and the Discourses, Lefort traces the emergence of the "form" of modern society, providing a first definition of the political. According to him, Machiavelli and the humanists before him present a new conception of politics and society that cannot be founded in a transcendent power.22 The Claude Lefort Archives at the EHESS contain some courses (Lefort, 1975, 1976) from the 1970s in which Lefort analyzes the birth of political modernity and the role of Florentine humanists, in particular of Coluccio Salutati. While premodern society, structured in a religious language, presents itself as static, hierarchical, and indisputable in its structure, the modern one, seen at its dawn by Machiavelli, is a society without foundation. If transcendence unifies the former, the latter is divided in itself. It develops through an internal opposition precisely due to its lack of foundation. It is only in this context, Lefort states that one could understand the ninth chapter of The Prince, where Machiavelli affirms that each political body is divided into two different humors—the nobles and the people—and that the relationship between them determines institutions.33 Machiavelli is defining the civil principality when he states "I maintain that one reaches this princedom either with the favor of the common people or with that of the nobility, since these two different humours are found in every body politic. They arise from the fact that the people do not wish to be commanded or oppressed by the nobles, while the nobles do desire to command and to oppress the people. From these two opposed appetites, there arises in cities one of three effects: a principality, liberty, or licence" (Machiavelli, 2005, p. 35). Again, it is always in this theoretical framework that one must include Machiavelli's defense of tumults in the ancient Roman Republic (Machiavelli, 1996, pp. 16–17). The strength and greatness of ancient Rome derived from its ability to govern the internal division between the plebs and the Senate, never trying to extinguish it or hide it. Disunity is therefore affirmed, is productive of freedom, and cannot be evaded (Poirier, 2015). The particular role of power emerges in this context as the aim of the dispute that characterizes these internally fractured societies (Trinidade, 2013). Power is the element that appears from the division, the place to which civil society directs their requests of legitimacy. Only throughout this continuous battle for power does society recognize itself by means of the terms of its division. In this modern form, power is an empty place, because it is no longer incarnate, not consubstantial to any subject or principle, always subject to continuous redefinition. In this image one can read all the contrasts with the society of the Ancièn Regime where power was embodied in the body of the king and founded in divine justification (Lefort, 1986, pp. 292–306). In this sense, Lefort says, power is a symbolic pole on whose definition depends the actual organization of a community. As the outcome of internal conflict, it is inside society, but at the same time, it is as if it were external because it gives shape to the entire social field and is never completely attainable and appropriable. In this paradoxical definition, power says something about the impossibility, for the modern form of the social, to reach a foundation, to reach unity, to coincide with itself. Therefore, from the modern loss of the foundation a society immanent and master to itself does not emerge. On the contrary, modernity presents a social form always open to alterity. This structure of society and power exhibits a real symbolic revolution, and the concept of the political is first of all a useful tool to describe it. It is the first feature of the modern social form as divided and continuously defined through conflict. Therefore, le politique is not politics as actually exercised, but its cause and explanation. It is the name of the symbolic dimension that allows political conflict. Thus, one can define modern society as political because it can never reach itself, its essence, or a unity, because it is always separated, defined by division, by conflict, and is aware of this condition. In this kind of society power has no foundation and every definition—of the social, of power, of community, of values, of political subjects—is always questioned, always representative of an interpretation. More than that, according to Lefort, these elements that characterize modernity also define the democratic form of society. We could thus say that democracy is the name of political modernity, of the society in which the political dimension is evident. Following this theory, democratic modernity is a particular symbolic institution of the social that accepts groundlessness, conflict, and the impossibility of society's total coincidence with itself. Power, as a symbolic pole, is the place in which one can read these characteristics: it is the empty place of an unattainable otherness. It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process that, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support that these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions that isolate them from another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies (Foucault, 1978, pp. 92–93).77 The conception of power as a productive relationship dispersed in society and its relationship with knowledge is already anticipated in the 1972–1973 lectures and then in Discipline and Punish. See in particular the lesson of March 28, 1973 in Foucault (2015, pp. 225-47, 1995, pp. 26–28). Foucault's intent is still to highlight dispersion below continuity. Rather than seeking in a single nucleus of sovereignty the place from which the relations scattered throughout society would radiate, he investigates the local and unstable relations of force that structure power-knowledge discourses (Foucault, 1995, pp. 27–28). In this perspective there is no symbolic pole that gives meaning to power relations scattered throughout society. On the contrary, it is necessary to examine these latter in their micro-physics, in their immanence, renouncing totality, continuity, and origin. According to Foucault, power does not exist in a dimension external to the social. Everything can be traced back to the confines of society, to contingency. It is only in the actual expression of power relationships that it is possible to follow their sense of strategy. As he states it in a way that points unambiguously to a critique of Lefort, "if it is true that Machiavelli was among the few [...] who conceived the power of the Prince in terms of force relationships, perhaps we need to go one step further, do without the persona of the Prince, and decipher power mechanisms on the basis of a strategy that is immanent in force relationships" (Foucault, 1978, p. 97). While Lefort elevated Machiavelli to a key figure for understanding contemporary society, the original division of the social, the role of power, and the concept of the political, the Florentine, in Foucault's view, became a character to be set aside (Foucault, 2003, p. 18).88 Alain Brossat notes that Foucault's anti Machiavellianism is unsatisfactory, superficial and responds to an argumentative and tactical need. The real target would be, in fact, just Lefort. "En clair, visant le 'nuage' Machiavel, Foucault entend bien atteindre cette autre cible qui se tient derrière le nuage—Claude Lefort dont le magnum opus et thèse de doctorat Le travail de l'œuvre Machiavel a été publié en 1972. Foucault ne s'en prend jamais explicitement à Lefort, mais ses raisons de s'opposer à lui portent bien au-delà de leurs lectures racialement différentes de Machiavel" (Brossat, forthcoming, p. 146). This reference is certainly polemical and his analysis of Machiavelli has little value. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to detect deeper theoretical reasons below it. Not only two different ideas of reading power are at stake here, but also two ways of analyzing society and understanding the relationship between theory and politics, and thought and being. But the controversy around the figure of Machiavelli was perhaps also the sign of a debate, of a deep disagreement between two different theories that were emerging in the French debate, as well as between two different groups of people, and it is to this that I now turn. The Will to Knowledge was published in 1976. During the same year, the first issue of the journal "Libre" appears. Its editorial board consisted of Claude Lefort, Miguel Abensour, Cornelius Castoriadis, Pierre Clastres, Marcel Gauchet, and Maurice Luciani. One could say that they were some of the representatives of a current of thought, whose place of reference began to be the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, different from the one that dominated the intellectual debate of the time and that a few years earlier had occupied the new faculty of philosophy at the Vincennes University.99 For more about this French current of thought see Marchart (2007), Breaugh et al. (2015), and Couture et al. (2019). The opening article of the first issue of the review, entitled "Nowadays" (Maintenant) and signed by Lefort, takes the opportunity to define the theoretical line of the group and its position among French cultural debate. The author uses 1968 as a symbolic date to consider the 8 years that have preceded and passed since the events of May and to draw up an assessment of the state of philosophical and social theory in France. The 8 years prior to 1968 are described as marked by a renewed scientific spirit that, through structuralism, linguistics, and the rational analysis of power networks, affected the humanities. The article presents a clear criticism of this approach: all these theories, even in their heterogeneity, share the same fascination for a formalism under which they hide the horizon of reality. The object of knowledge becomes sufficient for itself. Any difference between the knowable object and the knowing subject is suppressed and any discourse about the object and knowledge itself is removed. In summary, these kinds of theories eliminate the discourse of interpretation, the otherness of the symbolic. Structuralism is obviously among the main polemic targets. It conceals under the image of structure the difference between subject and object, systematizing objects within a network that neutralizes any discourse on the object itself (Lefort, 1977, 2007, pp. 275–299). In the 8 years after 1968, Lefort underlines a different discourse that seems to overturn and reject every scientific method. It calls into question the idea of science and theory. In this new kind of discourse, the concept of knowledge and power coincide and the latter is reduced to coercion. Despite its innovative aspect, this discourse does nothing but bring modern objectivism to a different level. It is characterized by the same circumvention of interpretation that defined structuralism. Even this new discourse, in fact, reduces knowledge to the known object and power to ratios of strength. The polemical references here are the theories of desire in Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse, and above all the works of Gilles Deleuze and Foucault. Although Foucault is never explicitly mentioned, his theory of power is the main object of criticism. does his best to create the empty, placing than a set of operations, whose doers would appear as simple intersection points between different networks, or, better, of which there would be no doers: each being, at a given level, is a part in a technique that converts him/her into a controller or controlled, and, as a human being, is divided into an indefinite number of excitations to produce power or resistance (Lefort, 2007, p. 285).1010 My translation. To bring to light the dimension of the political, to bring to light the historical dimension: a single task. The political defines neither a set of institutions in society, nor a network of relations extracted as an object from multiple networks equally useful to matters of science. If we care about this word, despite the perversion of its use, it is because it allows us to think the whole of the social—not a substance—but this differentiated milieu, open to the generality of representation and open to itself in the work of representation, arranged in such a way that it is a matter of its identity and at the same time it is a question of the real outside wherein individuals find their identifying references and access to the same real (Lefort, 2007, p. 294). Once again the controversy simplifies some aspects of Foucauldian thought, bringing it closer to the theory of desire in Reich and Marcuse. Beneath these polemical aspects, however, it is possible to trace deep theoretical reasons that divide the two authors. To better understand them, it is necessary to go back to the 1960s, to the first contrasts between the two authors. The first half of the 1960s marks, for Foucault, a commitment to a total historicization of the forms of knowledge (Foucault, 1988, 2003b). After the publication of Les mots et les choses in 1966, it is time for him to define and defend his method of investigation (Foucault, 2001). In this context appears the Réponse au Cercle d'épistémologie in 1968 on "Cahiers pour l'analyse" (Foucault, 1998, pp. 279–296). It is a short essay in which the French philosopher answers some questions posed by the Cercle about the clarification of the conception of historical transition and the place from which his analysis moves. However, well beyond the explanation of his past research, these few pages outline a new mode of investigation. Here, Foucault stresses how history has been and is mostly read through the lens of continuity, permanence, long periods, and regularities beneath the apparent disorder of the events.1212 Foucault's polemical reference at this stage is the Nouvelle Histoire of Annales and, in particular, the work of Fernand Braudel. For more on Foucault's distinctive approach to history see O'Farrell (1989), Flynn (2005 and Gutting 2003, pp. 29–48), and Falzon (Falzon, O'Leary, Sawicki, 2013, pp. 282–298). Fracture and incoherence are issues that historians must circumvent, bringing them back to a broader stable framework. A series of unjustified notions—causality, tradition, influence, development, teleology, mentality, or the spirit of an era—holds this way of thinking becoming. They are admitted before any examination and it is therefore necessary to get rid of them. Following the analyses of Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, Foucault proposes to deconstruct these notions to get out of the fiction of continuity. It first means to deal only with a set of dispersed events (Foucault, 1998, p. 303) and to analyze only later how they relate to each other in shaping certain knowledge. It is not about recognizing a unitary history under the plurality of events. The path must be reversed: starting from fragmentation, how the various elements interact is reconstructed.1313 See O ' Farrell (1989, pp. 44–64). This implies the deconstruction of discourses on knowledge in order to trace their constitution from out of the interaction between discursive elements. Such a method, conceiving of difference before unity, consistently remains Foucault's path of analysis (Revel, 2003, pp. 59–63). The unities that must above all be questioned are those appearing most immediately: those of the book and the oeuvre (œuvre). It does not take much to realize that no book exists per se. It is rather a dot in a network that its very definition and physiognomy depend on. As much as the book can offer itself as an object that you can shake in your hands, its unity is relative and only based on a wider discursive field (Foucault, 1998, pp. 303–304). The notion of oeuvre involves similar or greater problems. Apparently, it is the simple sum of texts that can be referred to the proper name of an author. However, as soon as one tries to clarify what this name means, the object escapes. The link between text and name is not at all immediate. In addition to writings an author has published under his own name, there may be others signed with a pseudonym, some designed to be printed in life and others again still remain in draft form and perhaps published only after his death. Brief, the definition of oeuvre seems to presuppose a series of theoretical choices. Reducing the coherence and unity of a given oeuvre to a certain "function of expression" or to the common reference of all the elements that compose it or to the thought of an author seem to be possible solutions. However, Foucault states that this unity also consists of a preliminary interpretative operation that involves the definition of the thought in question (Foucault, 1998, p. 305).1414 On these themes and on the deconstruction of the figure of the author see also the essay "What is an author?" (Foucault, 1998, pp. 205–222). The text is a transcription of a speech given at the Collège de France in 1969. Notions of author and oeuvre support the fiction of uninterrupted continuity: the discourse is already organized in advance through a preliminary datum, an always presupposed and unalterable origin. Indeed, the notion of origin acts in the background of two postulates. The first one assumes that it is never possible to fix, in the order of the discourse, the eruption of an actual event. The continuity of events and discourses is guaranteed by common reference to a secret and unattainable origin (Foucault, 1998, pp. 305–306). According to the second postulate, directly connected to the first, every manifest discourse always depends on something "already said" that is at the same time a "never said." Every element of a discourse would thus already be traceable in a previous semi-silence, in the hollow of what has already been expressed. Here, continuity is assured by a flow of constant, silent, and original meaning to which all discourses are connected. Foucault's aim is to overturn this perspective and examine discourses not by reference to a hidden principle or a foundation, but in the play of their immediacy, grasping them as events.1515 It is known that Foucauldian criticism of the origin is influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche. In this regard see at least "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (Foucault, 1998, pp. 369–392) and Righetti (2012). In short, it is about deconstructing the unreflected continuities, showing how below the functions of oeuvre and author one can find, not a common origin, but a discursive field composed by individual statements. It is the project of a pure description of the facts of discourses (Foucault, 1998, p. 306), understanding this latter as a completely immanent, limited and finite set, only composed by language sequences that have been formulated. Archaeology of Knowledge, published in 1969, better illustrates this project (Foucault, 2002). The archaeological method, as it is now explained, consists in reading history through difference, describing discourses and statements as singular and immanent practices, as events defined by discontinuity (Foucault, 2002, p. 31). Adopting such a methodology means disregarding any transcendental and instead analyzing discourses in their actual contingency, as scattered elements that get organized in their actual appearance, without any external rule.1616 The study of Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) continues to be important for understanding Foucault's archaeological method. However, this does not mean that statements appear on the discursive scene ex nihilo that they are pure and chaotic emergence. Not everything can be said; not every statement can be formulated at any time. Statements depend first and foremost on a historical a-priori that represents their condition of reality. They depend on a law that circumscribes what can be said. This a-priori does not recall the external and universal structure theorized by structuralism. Rather, it is implicated in the same elements that it regulates (Foucault, 2002, pp. 142–143).1717 The Foucauldian historical a-priori reworks and historicizes the notion presented by Edmund Husserl in The Origin of Geometry. In this regard cf. what Han (2002) wrote. The set of systems of statements is what Foucault proposes to call "the archive": the law of what can be said, "the general system of the formation and transformation of statements" (Foucault, 2002, p. 146). It is a scheme in which you are inserted, from within which you speak, and which is therefore impossible to describe in its totality. The last figure that gives depth to discursive systems is the episteme that is "the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems" (Foucault, 2002, p. 211).1818 Foucault (2001) already presented the notion of episteme. However, all these concepts, far from proposing a transcendent dimension capable of giving unity and continuity to history, refer to a completely historicized framework of rules that, while commanding the relations between statements and discourses, are at the same time consubstantial to such relationships. The Foucauldian attempt is that of thinking, through empirical-transcendental concepts such as the historical a-priori, the archive, or the episteme, the conditions of historical possibilities immanent to phenomena. This is a completely historical structure that adds nothing to what actually exists, that is, that has been pronounced. Therefore, through the method of archaeology, Foucault proposes an analysis of the historical becoming that can disregard any teleology and foundation. He describes a completely historicized and also consubstantial structure to the regulated elements, which gives an entirely contingent unity to the series of dispersed statements and events from which discourses and knowledge take shape. To understand historical development was the core issue of Claude Lefort's thought since 1950s. According to Lefort, the challenge is also to give reason to discontinuity, both in progressive terms—the fractures in becoming—and in synchronic terms—the coexistence of different forms of historicity (Lefort, 1978, pp. 46–77). His critique moves first and foremost against rationalist theories—Hegel, Husserl, Marx—that read history as unity and continuity guaranteed by a universal reason. However, as Lefort argues, such theories are unable to account for those societies—the Asian states for Hegel and Marx or the so-called primitive societies described by ethnologists—which do not fit this image, persisting in a situation of stagnation (Lefort, 1978, pp. 47–51). According to the philosopher, to explain such different temporalities it is necessary to understand how they are in some way "unconsciously chosen" by every society. Temporalities are the result of a culture. The ethnological studies, to which the philosopher devotes himself in the early 1950s, corroborates this kind of explanation, showing how every society organizes itself through a sort of self-interpretation, that is, through a discourse on itself that gives rise to a horizon of meaning.1919 Since the early 1950s, Lefort read the works of Marcel Mauss, Roger Bastide, Claude Lévi-Strauss, the classics of American culturalism (Linton, Kardiner, Bateson) and British functionalism (Malinowski, Evans-Pritchard). For more on Lefort's reading of anthropological studies, see Moyn (2013). Accepting the reconstructions of ethnologists, Lefort thinks that every society "institutes itself" through a symbolic dimension that determines its relationships with time, space, and other cultures, and even the internal organization of institutions and relationships. It is the difference between the self-representations of various societies, between symbolic institutions, that determines so many different relationships with temporality and historical change. It is useful to specify how symbolic institution does not involve the restoration of a transcendent dimension of which the social would be an attribute. Indeed, it is nothing more than the result of a discourse that the social makes about itself, of a self-representation.2020 The closeness to Jacques Lacan's work and the theory of the "mirror stage" is evident. Beyond the historical evidence (the two knew each other and Lefort attends Lacan's semin

Michel foucault · Foucault, Power, and Ethics · Philosophy, Sociology, Political Theory · Political Theology and Sovereignty

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