Saṃghabhadra on Perception of Nonexistence

Can nonexistence be perceived? While the answer may seem obviously negative, proving this is not straightforward. This article extracts several arguments for the claim that "non-existence cannot be an object of perception" from the reasoning provided by Saṃghabhadra regarding "non-existence cannot be an object of *buddhi ." Two main arguments are reconstructed, and both are reductio ad absurdum . The first suggests that if any nonexistence could be perceived, all instances of nonexistence would be perceived. Combined with Saṃghabhadra's causal theory of perception, this implies that one perception could perceive all instances of nonexistence. The second posits that if nonexistence were an object of perception, it would result in no perception occurring at all. As a problem-oriented study, this article reconstructs and evaluates Saṃghabhadra's arguments, demonstrating that "non-existence cannot be perceived" is not as easily proved as it appears, and Saṃghabhadra's insightful arguments, though vulnerable to challenges, hold promise for further defense

Causal structure · Object (grammar · Perception · Reductio ad absurdum · Indian and Buddhist Studies · Mindfulness and Compassion Interventions · Philosophy and Theoretical Science