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Naïve Learning with Uninformed Agents

Bibliographic Data

ID7521071
AuthorsAbhijit Banerjee (0000-0001-9923-6088, Department of Economics, MIT, BREAD, JPAL, and NBER (email: ), corresponding author), Emily Breza (0000-0002-4745-4689, Department of Economics, Harvard, BREAD, JPAL, and NBER (email: )), Arun G Chandrasekhar (Department of Economics, Stanford, BREAD, JPAL, and NBER (email: )), Markus Mobius (0000-0002-4725-7896, Microsoft Research New England, University of Michigan, and NBER (email: ))
Year2021
Volume111
Issue11
Pages3540-3574
Publication date2021-10-27
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Economic Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0002-8282 • E-ISSN: 1944-7981
PublisherAmerican Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1257/aer.20181151
OpenAlexW2912507001
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited29

The DeGroot model has emerged as a credible alternative to the standard Bayesian model for studying learning on networks, offering a natural way to model naïve learning in a complex setting. One unattractive aspect of this model is the assumption that the process starts with every node in the network having a signal. We study a natural extension of the DeGroot model that can deal with sparse initial signals. We show that an agent’s social influence in this generalized DeGroot model is essentially proportional to the degree-weighted share of uninformed nodes who will hear about an event for the first time via this agent. This characterization result then allows us to relate network geometry to information aggregation. We show information aggregation preserves “wisdom” in the sense that initial signals are weighed approximately equally in a model of network formation that captures the sparsity, clustering, and small-world properties of real-world networks. We also identify an example of a network structure where essentially only the signal of a single agent is aggregated, which helps us pinpoint a condition on the network structure necessary for almost full aggregation. Simulating the modeled learning process on a set of real-world networks, we find that there is on average 22.4 percent information loss in these networks. We also explore how correlation in the location of seeds can exacerbate aggregation failure. Simulations with real-world network data show that with clustered seeding, information loss climbs to 34.4 percent. (JEL D83, D85, Z13

Bayesian inference · Bayesian probability · Cluster analysis · Data mining · Econometrics · Information aggregation · Information cascade · Network formation · Process (computing · Set (abstract data type · Statistics · Artificial Intelligence · Complex Network Analysis Techniques · Computer Science · Mathematics · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence

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Unique citing works4
Citations per year1,33
Citation span2023 - 2025 (3)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 4

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